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DiFonzo: Unbundling Marriage

UNBUNDLING MARRIAGE
James Herbie DiFonzo*
Two disappointedbelievers
Two peopleplaying the game
Negotiations and love songs
Are often mistakenfor one and the same
Now the man and the woman they remain in contact
Let us say it'sfor the child
With disagreements about the meaning of a marriagecontract
Conversations hardand wild'
Marriage is emerging as a "bundle" of legal benefits and burdens.
The history of domestic relations has produced a cornucopia of family
arrangements, and the yield shows no signs of diminishing. At the same
time, our yearning for a halcyon past has led many to the erroneous
belief that the family formation consisting of two parents and the
children of their 'til-death-do-they-part union is the only culturally
authentic and "traditional" one. 2 In fact, as Michael Grossberg has
observed, our domestic past has been characterized by "the constant

reality of American family diversity." 3 As twenty-first century families
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. J.D., M.A. 1977, Ph.D. 1993,
University of Virginia. E-mail: lawjhd@hofstra.edu. An embryonic version of this Essay was
presented at the Conference on Marriage, Democracy, and Families, Hofstra University School of
Law, March 2003. My thanks to Linda McClain, who organized the conference and helped me with
ideas for crafting this Essay. Thanks also to John DeWitt Gregory, Joanna Grossman, and Ruth
Stem, who lent their critical eyes and wise counsel. A special word of appreciation to Tricia
Kasting, whose bibliographic assistance was both exhaustive (for me) and exhausting (for her), and
who always labors with grace and humor. The Hofstra University School of Law also offered
support by way of a summer research grant, for which I am grateful.
1. PAUL SIMON, Train in the Distance, on NEGOTIATIONS AND LOVE SONGS 1971-1988
(Warner Bros. 1988).
2. See JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING FAMILY VALUES IN THE
POSTMODERN AGE 6 (1996); see also generally STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE:
AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP (1992).

3. Jeffrey Evans Stake & Michael Grossberg, Roundtable: Opportunitiesfor and Limitation
of Private Ordering in Family Law, 73 IND. L.J. 535, 554 (1998) (remarks by Michael Grossberg);
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are exploring new contours, the legal system is equally awash with new
concepts of marital and nonmarital relationships. This Essay surveys the
contested legal terrain of family formation today, and suggests that
further development will largely be a product of the coming
disaggregation of the legal elements which constitute the statesanctioned marriage. Marriage is being reformulated in response to a
variety of social pressures: from same-sex couples seeking admission;
from heterosexual couples seeking to customize their marriages; and
from states, municipalities, and private groups crafting alternative
versions of marriage-like partnerships. These "disagreements about the
meaning.., of a marriage contract" often do lead to "[c]onversations
hard and wild." 4 But this Essay concludes that marriage will ultimately
be reshaped into a more fluid and multi-factored form, more responsive
to the needs of an ever-more diverse population.
In its first section, this Essay defends the continued relevance and
importance of marriage against the considerable chorus claiming that
society's familial tasks would be better performed by contractuallybound sets of individuals who ask nothing more from the state than that
it enforce domestic obligations as it does other civil contracts. Marriage
has, in truth, been reformed and deformed so much and so often that it
appears unrecognizable to many cultural observers. However, the battles
over its shifting shape should not distract us from the essential function
marriage plays in refining and disseminating vital social norms.
The second section discusses the coming "unbundling" of
American marriage. Here I suggest that family law is moving from a
conception of marriage as an institution with a uniform meaning to a
more variegated view that assesses marriage in terms of discrete
groupings, or "bundles," of rights and responsibilities. These new
configurations of marriage's elements are highlighted in the
development of civil unions and domestic partnerships, which replicate
the privileges and pains of marriage in a marriage-like status. Although
see also MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-

CENTURY AMERICA 9-30 (1985) (discussing a legal climate characterized by disputes over the
proper scope of domestic authority, both in public and private realms).
4.

SIMON, supra note 1.

5. My discussion of "bundling" principles for the elements of marriage is adapted from the
economic theory of bundling, based on "the practice of grouping together several services or
products into a single package that is then offered to the consumer at one price." BUSINESS
ENCYCLOPEDIA DICTIONARY, at http://www.economist.com/encyclopedia/Dictionary.cfm (last
visited Jan. 19, 2004); see also Scott Worden, Micropayments and the Future of the Web, at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/fallsem98/final_papers/Worden.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2004)
("Economists refer to the practice of grouping items together for a single sale as bundling."); infra
text accompanying notes 92, 97-98, 142, 147-50, 154.
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the role of contract will continue to increase in crafting familial
understandings (and misunderstandings), allocating these bundles of
domestic burdens and benefits may become the primary
way for the state
6
to preserve its important "channelling function.",
The final section of the Essay undertakes a preliminary sketch of
the impact of bundling principles on the legal construction of marriage.
Provisions regulating domestic partnerships and civil unions, as well as
the increase in premarital contracting and such reform proposals as the
American Law Institute's ("ALl") treatment of "domestic partners" in its
recently issued Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution
("Principles")7 have shifted the discourse on marriage and divorce in a
key way. Although not directly aiming at this target, these legal reforms
may yet succeed in reconfiguring the terms of the bargain between the
state and every family. Reexamining marriage through its myriad
elements may allow us to reconfigure the institution so that the publicprivate debate continues to be fruitful in expanding marital freedom
under law.
I.

THE SHAPE-SHIFTING MARRIAGE

Ironies abound in the history of marriage. Throughout the
nineteenth century, the dominant legal theory insisted that once husband
and wife made a voluntary choice to marry, they lost any further
freedom with regard to the marriage, instead subjecting themselves to
the terms imposed by the state. 8 The Supreme Court's most oft-quoted
recitation of the legal and cultural contours of marriage occurred in an
1888 case in which the Court condemned the "loose morals and
shameless conduct of the husband" as "meriting the strongest
reprobation," 9 but nonetheless rhapsodized upon the lofty ideals of the
social obligations of married life:

6. Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495,
503 (1992) (emphasizing the role of the state in fostering and directing the development of
marriage).
7. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 6 ("Domestic Partners") (2002) [hereinafter ALI
PRINCIPLES].

8. See Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women 's
Rights and Family Law in the United States Duringthe Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2017,
2021 (2000).
9. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210 (1888).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2003

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 32:31

Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having
more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other
institution, has always been subject to the control of the legislature.

The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds the parties to
various obligations and liabilities. It is an institution, in the
maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it
is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there
would be neither civilization nor progress. 0
These core concerns with marriage's moral excellence are at odds
with the opportunistic behavior at play in the case.'" The husband left his
first wife and children in Ohio in 1850, bound for the Oregon
Territory. 12 He pledged them his continued support and specified that he
would either return within two years or send for them.' 3 But the husband
reneged on his promises and abandoned his family.14 He then secured
the passage of a legislative act in the Oregon Territory granting him a
divorce, and soon afterwards married again.' 5 The Supreme Court
territorial legislature had the
excoriated the husband, but held that the
6
divorce.'
legislative
the
award
power to
Thus, the Supreme Court's anthem to marital purity was awkwardly
sung in a morally messy case. The Court's strident censure of the
husband's actions represented particularly feckless dictum in an opinion
which both vindicated the wayward husband's means in seeking a
legislative divorce, and validated the result he achieved by affirming the
state's jurisdiction to bypass the judiciary in awarding the dissolution
itself.' 7 The Justices doubtless considered the goal of reinforcing state
control over marriage and divorce to be worth the cost of sanctioning
10.

ld.at 205, 211.

11. The full story contrasting the upright legal theory of the case with its decadent factual
background is told in Steven H. Hobbs, Love on the Oregon Trail: What the Story of Maynard v.
Hill Teaches Us About Marriage and Democratic Self-Governance, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111

(2003). The lack of congruence between domestic relations law and practice developed in the
infancy of American history. See, e.g., MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY
1N EARLY AMERICA 58-59 (1986) (describing colonial practice of "wife sale" and arbitrated extralegal divorces).
12. See Maynard, 125 U.S. at 192.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. Seeid. at 193.

16.

See id.
at 210.

17. See id. at 205, 208.
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one spouse's fall from grace. In so doing, the Court echoed one of
nineteenth century American society's core beliefs about the family,
which did not change as the next century began. As Hendrik Hartog
observed, marriage "was the one
large relational identity still available
' 8
in the early twentieth century."
Marriage has survived through American history despite continuous
wrangling over the proper contours of the institution. When Judge Ben
B. Lindsey wrote Companionate Marriage in 1927, many fumed at his
audacity in defining this form of nuptial union as "legal marriage, with
legalized Birth Control, and with the right to divorce by mutual consent
for childless couples, usually without payment of alimony."' 19 But Judge
Lindsey was proposing nothing new: "Companionate Marriage is
already an established social fact in this country. '20 He identified this
type of connubial status as a rump regime easily able to outwit the
formal legal system:
[Companionate Marriage] is conventionally respectable. Sophisticated
people are, without incurring social reproach, everywhere practicing
Birth Control and are also obtaining collusive divorce, outside the law,
whenever they want it. They will continue
the practice, and no amount
21
of prohibitive legislation can stop them.

18. Hendrik Hartog, Remarks at the Hofstra University School of Law Conference on
Marriage, Democracy, and Families (Mar. 14, 2003) (videotape on file with Hofstra Law Review).
Note, however, that state sovereignty over marriage was not a value universally or unquestioningly
held. In his mid-nineteenth century study of American marriage, historian Auguste Carlier described
the tension between individualism and community control in one aspect of marital affairs:
It is true, some people hold that the [public rituals] of marriage [are] of no interest; that
the union of the individuals is their exclusive affair alone, and concerns no one else. This
reasoning arises from the predominant idea in America, that the individual is superior to
the community, and that the latter should not exercise any restraints, except in rare cases,
and from reasons of most serious moment. But it is forgotten that marriage is the
foundation of the family, and creates new relations between persons who have been
strangers to each other; and hence come rights and duties of every nature, domestic,
civil, political: and we cannot too much protect an institution, the most ancient and
respectable of all, where morality is tempered by social condition.
AUGUSTE CARLIER, MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 36-37 (David J. Rothman & Sheila M.
Rothman eds., Arco Press, Inc. 1972) (1867).
19. BEN B. LINDSEY & WAINWRIGHT EVANS, THE COMPANIONATE MARRIAGE v (1927).
Judge Lindsey further defined companionate marriage as "a state of lawful wedlock, entered into for
love, companionship, and co6peration by persons who, for reasons of health, finances,
temperament, etc., are not prepared at the time of their marriage to undertake the care of a family."
Id. at 175.
20. Id. at v.
21. Id.; see also id. at 244 ("The fact that contraception and divorce by mutual consent
(collusion) are illegal does not particularly matter so long as people have the good sense to practice
them anyway.").
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Lindsey was correct, of course, and although many claimed he was
out to destroy marriage,22 his only fault may have been a touch of
prescience. Writing shortly after World War II, sociologist Paul H.
Landis observed that the "companionship family," which "prizes
romance and its ethereal happiness," was replacing the "institutional
family.., rooted in the traditions of child-bearing, joint economic
activity and filial duty.",23 Overall, the social history of the nineteenth
and twentieth century American family may be characterized as
"moving from an [sic] hierarchically ordered household closely
integrated with the community towards an egalitarian, companionate
family sharply separated from the public world. 2 4
At first light of the twenty-first century, however, marriage has
moved from the bedrock of society to a more precarious perch atop the
sands of a polity in transition. And no wonder.- The uprising in divorce
law and culture that has characterized the period beginning in
approximately 1970,25 along with the marked increase in cohabitation
among unmarried couples, 26 are but two indicia that the relationship
between marriage and the state is in flux. 27 What is marriage today?
22. COMPANIONATE MARRIAGE became the "leading literary symbol of the American sexual
revolution of the twenties." CHARLES LARSEN, THE GOOD FIGHT: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF BEN B.
LINDSEY 173 (1972). Judge Lindsey's attacks on the prevailing moral ethos triggered vibrant public
reaction. As his biographer noted, "[p]opular magazines and Sunday supplements found the
temptation to ballyhoo companionate marriage irresistible." Id. at 174.
23. Paul H. Landis, Divorce in Our Time, 105 FORUM 865, 865 (1946).
24. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1144
(1985).
25. See generally J. HERBIE DiFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL
CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 145-77 (1997) (describing the effect of

California's no-fault divorce legislation within California and subsequently across the nation).
26. From 1990 to 2000, the number of unmarried couples increased seventy-two percent,
from 3.2 million to 5.5 million. A Census report released in 2003 indicated that, while married
couples make up fifty-two percent of all households, their prevalence continues to decline as the
households of unmarried domestic partners, both opposite-sex and same-sex, proliferate. See
Christopher Marquis, Total of Unmarried Couples Surged in 2000 US. Census, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
13, 2003, at A22; see also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Calibrated Commitment: The Legal Treatment of
Marriage and Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1435, 1436 (2001) (attesting to signs that,
given the proliferation of marital alternatives, the "institutionalization of cohabitation already has
begun").
27. As she has done through much of her career, Mary Ann Glendon anticipated the issue of
the transformation of nonmarital cohabitation into marriage, when she observed over a quartercentury ago that historically "our legal response to cohabitation has been to pretend it is marriage
and then attribute to it the traditional incidents of marriage." Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the
State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REV. 663, 692 (1976). She predicted that the
"interesting question" would become "whether the increase in, and increased visibility and
respectability of, informal marriage will bring about a casting-off of these legal fictions and the
direct attribution of economic consequences to de facto dependency." Id. at 693.
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Some commentators have thrown up their hands, confessing an inability
to hit a moving target. Homer H. Clark, Jr. signaled his surrender in
these words:
[C]ontemporary marriage cannot be legally defined any more precisely
than as some sort of relationship between two individuals, of
indeterminate duration, involving some kind of sexual conduct,
entailing vague mutual property and support obligations, a relationship
which may be28formed by consent of both parties and dissolved at the
will of either.

More recently, E. J. Graff queried whether marriage is "just an
atavistic throwback to a feudal world of family property, of men's desire
to control and patrol women's reproductive organs-or ...

of a

woman's desire to tie down some man while her attractions are still
29

fresh."

Some seek to remove the pedestal from under marriage, toppling
the institution and replacing it with other, more loosely structured,
affiliations. 30 David B. Cruz has called for a constitutional interpretation
28.

HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 2.1,

at 30 (2d ed., student ed. 1988). Martha Fineman has articulated a number of possible meanings for
marriage:
Marriage has various meanings to individuals entering into it. Marriage can be
experienced as: a legal tie, a symbol of commitment, a privileged sexual affiliation, a
relationship of hierarchy and subordination, a means of self-fulfillment, a societal
construct, a cultural phenomenon, a religious mandate, an economic relationship, a
preferred reproductive unit, a way to ensure against poverty and dependency, a romantic
ideal, a natural or divined connection, a stand-in for morality, a status, or a contractual
relationship.
Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 239, 242 (2001) (footnote
omitted).
29. E. J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR? 36-37 (1999). As always, history's sweep
uncovers contemporary queries in the mouths of our ancestors. Turmoil in the married state at the
dawn of the twentieth century prompted one commentator to wonder if "marriage as we have known
it [will] survive even to the next generation? Can it survive?" Id. at 249 (quoting Felix Adler's 1905
plaint, MARRIAGE & DIVORCE) (emphasis in original).
30. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, Looking at Marriage, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1766, 1768 (2000)
(questioning the utility of marriage and asking, "why not allow adults to choose their own means of
commitment to each other and/or to others"); June Carbone, Morality, Public Policy and the
Family: The Role of Marriage and the Public/PrivateDivide, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 267, 28183 (1996) (discussing alternatives to marriage, including those based upon private ordering);
Summer L. Nastich, Questioning the Marriage Assumptions: The Justificationsfor "Opposite-Sex
Only" Marriage as Support for the Abolition of Marriage, 21 LAW & INEQ. 114, 116 (2003)
(arguing that "while limiting legal marriage to opposite-sex couples is completely unjustifiable,
marriage itself is unjustifiable-whether opposite-sex, same-sex, or both"); Nancy D. Polikoff, Why
Lesbians and Gay Men Should Read MarthaFineman, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 167,
167 (2000) (rejecting same-sex marriage in favor of a "truly transformative model of family for all
people"); Ann Shalleck, FoundationalMyths and the Reality of Dependency: The Role of Marriage,
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which serves to "disestablish" sex and gender. 31 Nancy D. Polikoff has
questioned whether marriage should continue to be a privileged legal
status, 32 and both Martha Fineman and Judith Stacey have called for the
abolition of marriage. 33 In 2001, the Law Commission of Canada
8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 197 (2000); Frank Browning, Why Marry?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
17, 1996, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 133 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997) [hereinafter
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE] (rejecting marriage for same-sex couples in favor of"civic and legal support
for different kinds of families that can address the emotional, physical and financial obligations of
contemporary life"); Michael Kinsley, Abolish Marriage,WASH. POST, July 3, 2003, at A23 (calling
for the replacement of government-sanctioned marriage by a purely privatized version).
31. See generally David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997
(2002). Under Cruz' proposed constitutional hermeneutics, the "government would be significantly
constrained in its ability to rely upon or reinforce sex or gender beliefs or groups." Id. at 999.
Another thread in this argument objects to the provision of benefits to same-sex couples on the
ground that these measures yield to governments and employers unwanted power to determine
family behavior and composition:
The idea that monogamy, co-habitating, and sharing a check book [sic] are behaviors
somehow worthy of merit and financial protections is questionable at best. Should
corporations or governments be arbiters of how families construct themselves by
rewarding some and not others? What if you don't live with your long-time lover? Or
have several long-time lovers? Or none at all? What if you are straight but don't believe
in marriage? What if you're transgender, and therefore not easily categorizable as having
a "same"-sex or "opposite"[-]sex partner? In the current framework, you'd slip between
the cracks-unable to get married and unable to qualify for same-sex domestic
partnership benefits. What if you have a long-term relationship with a group of platonic
friends? You share check-books [sic] and mortgages but not beds. Or maybe you share
beds but not check-books [sic]. The point is: Who cares? By getting corporations to
extend benefits to same-sex couples who meet certain criteria we've agreed that it's okay
for it to be anyone's business. We've punished those that fall outside the nuclear family
model-gay or straight-and we've lent support to the idea that society should reward
certain kinds of families and relationships.
Cynthia Peters, Same-Sex Domestic Partnership Benefits Represent a Limited Gain, ZNET, Aug.
25, 2000, at http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2000-08/25peters.htm.
32. See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, Ending Marriage as We Know It, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV.
201 (2003).
33.

See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND

OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228-29 (1995) (calling for the elimination of special rules
governing marriage and divorce, and for regulating relationships between adult sexual partners
according to the ordinary rules of civil and criminal law); JUDITH STACEY, BRAVE NEW FAMILIES:
STORIES OF DOMESTIC UPHEAVAL IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 269 (1990) (arguing in
favor of eliminating marriage as an "ideological concept that imposes mythical homogeneity on the
diverse means by which people organize their intimate relationships"). Fineman "would take all the
benefits we now attach to marriage and attach them to the caretaker-dependent unit." Gayle White,
Weighing the Pros & Cons of Marriage: Con: Shift
Focus to Caretakers, Dependents, ATLANTA J.
CONST., Mar. 29, 2003, at BI (quoting Martha Fineman); see also Nastich, supra note 30, at 115,
116 (arguing that "marriage itself is unjustifiable" and "elimination of the legal institution of
marriage would accomplish the social goals and objectives of marriage more successfully than
marriage currently does"); Emily Taylor, Note, Across the Board: The Dismantling of Marriage in
Favor of Universal Civil Union Laws, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 171, 174 (2001) (advocating the
dismantling of all current marriage laws and their replacement by "civil union laws to be used by all
couples who seek the state derived benefits of their partnership").
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produced Beyond Conjugality, a report calling for the registration of
personal adult relationships in lieu of state-sanctioned marriage.34
The contested nature of the institution of marriage may also be seen
as a shadow over the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Lawrence v.
Texas.35 The case resolved the question whether a state statute making it
a crime for two individuals of the same sex to engage in certain intimate
sexual conduct violated the Due Process Clause.36 In deciding that it did,
the Court left for another day the issue whether a same-sex relationship
is ever "entitled to formal recognition in the law." 37 However, in dicta,
the Court suggested that the states may have less power over these
relationships than they have historically exercised. 38 The Court
elaborated on its rationale in prohibiting the criminalization of intimate,
consensual adult behavior:
This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or
a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its
boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law
protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to
enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their
own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.39
In his dissent, Justice Scalia contended that the Court's rationale
"dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a
distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions,
insofar as formal recognition of marriage is concerned." 40
Whether Justice Scalia's evaluation proves correct or not,4 1 the
issue is plainly afire in both our domestic and global culture, as
34. See LAW COMM'N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING
CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS 117-24 (2001), available at http://collection.nlcbnc.ca/100/200/301/lcc-cdc/beyondconjugality-e/pdf/37152-e.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
35. 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
36. See id. at 2475.
37. Id. at 2478. Specifically, the Court noted that Lawrence "does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to
enter." Id. at 2484. Justice O'Connor concurred in the result, opining that in making only same-sex
sodomy criminal, the Texas statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 2486-87
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
38. See id. at 2479-80.
39. Id. at 2478. While the Court held that the Texas statute criminalizing same-sex sodomy
ran afoul of the Due Process clause, it also observed that a challenge to the law based upon the
Equal Protection Clause was "tenable." See id. at 2482.
40. Id. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also observed that the reasoning of
Justice O'Connor's opinion concurring in the judgment "leaves on pretty shaky grounds state laws
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples." Id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. See Joanna Grossman, The Consequences of Lawrence v. Texas, FINDLAW'S WRIT, (July
8, 2003), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com. Grossman writes:

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2003

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 3

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 32:31

illustrated by recent comments of President George W. Bush,4 2 a report
of the various views in American cities and churches,43 the government
44 the Vatican,45
of Canada,
commentators,46 and private organized
47
groups.
Certainly, individuals desiring to marry a person of the same sex have at least as
strong an interest in having that freedom, as individuals choosing to engage in sexual
conduct with a person of the same sex have in the freedom they are exercising. If not, the
Court will, at the same time, have given its protection to all forms of non-marital sexual
relationships-including wild one-night stands-while deterring the kind of permanent,
legally sanctioned relationships on which society has been built.
Id.
42. See Neil A. Lewis, Bush Backs Bid to Block Gays from Marrying, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
2003, at Al (reporting on President Bush's personal opposition to same-sex marriage, and his
exploration of efforts to codify a way to prohibit it).
43. See Associated Press, Grapplingwith Gay Marriage: Municipalities, Churchesfrom East
to West Consider New Rules, Laws (June 9, 2003), available at http://abcnews.go.com/
sections/relationships/US/gaymarriage03O6O9.htm (discussing responses of cities and church
groups to issues involving same-sex couples).
44. See Chantal H~bert, Gay Marriage Gambit Leaves Little Room for Doubt, TORONTO
STAR, July 18, 2003, at http://www.thestar.ca/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/
Layout/Article Typel &c=Article&cid = 1058479813313&callpageid=968332188492&col=968793
972154 (reporting that the Canadian government will not appeal the ruling of the Ontario Court of
Appeal that the definition of marriage should be silent on the sexual identity of the partners
involved). The issue remains controversial. See Randall Palmer, Gay Marriagean Explosive Issue
in
Canada, (Aug.
1,
2003),
at
http://home.eircom.net/content/reuters/worldnews/
I130730?view=Printer (reporting on the Canadian cultural and political turmoil over same-sex
marriage).
45. See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, ConsiderationsRegarding Proposalsto
Give Legal Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual Persons (July 31, 2003), at
http://www.vatican.va/romancuria/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc con cfaith do 20030731
homosexual-unionsen.html (reaffirming the Vatican's condemnation of both homosexual behavior
and efforts to afford legal recognition to homosexual unions); see also Kirk Semple, Vatican Says
Lawmakers Have Duty to Oppose Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES INT'L, July 31, 2003,
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/31/intemational/europe/3 1CNDVATICA.htmlex=1075093200&en=034aaeb8aadb66b2&ei=5070 (reporting on Vatican efforts to
halt the "spread of laws that recognize same-sex couples" in North America and Europe).
46. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Cold Feet: Why America Has Gay MarriageJitters, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2003, § 4, at 1 (describing the public's present greater acceptance of gay rights than of the
notion of gay marriage); Cathy Young, Gay Rights Go to Court, REASONONLINE (June 2003), at
http://reason.com/0306/co.cy.gay.shtml (reflecting on the impact of the gay rights movement on
Family Law, and concluding that "a true cultural shift will be brought about by the increased
visibility of the human face of same-sex relationships"). One aspect of the "human face" of these
relationships may be seen in articles on same-sex weddings in popular magazines, and in the
appearance in newspapers of same-sex wedding announcements. See, e.g., Bill Werde, A First at
Bride's Magazine: A Report on Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2003, at C6 (reporting on
the first publication of an article on same-sex weddings in one of the premier bridal magazines,
Cond6 Nast's Bride's magazine). The New York Times on August 3, 2003 carried announcements
for one same-sex wedding (in Toronto), two same-sex civil union ceremonies (in Vermont), and one
same-sex "commitment" ceremony (in New Hampshire). See Weddings & Celebrations, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003, § 9, at 10. That same issue also carried a news story of the progress of Rev. V.
Gene Robinson in his efforts to become the first openly gay elected bishop in the Episcopal Church.
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If marriage survives, it will surely continue its institutional

hybridization, moving in the general direction of embracing function
over form. As I argued in an earlier essay, "the generative entities of
family law, parents and other domestic unions, are undergoing a
utilitarian metamorphosis. ' '48 But the battles over the unsettled edges of
marriage should not distract us from a focus on the important role
marriage plays in refining and disseminating vital social norms. Strong

marriages are good for spouses, their children, and our society. 49 The
cast of the nuptial union matters less than the stake its members have in
declaring and preserving their mutual commitment, intimate happiness,
emotional forbearance, and financial support.50 Intact, healthy marriages
See Associated Press, Gay Bishop Wins First Vote (Aug. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.hollandsentinel.com/stories/080403/new_080403023.shtm. Rev. Robinson, a divorced
father of two children, has lived with his partner for thirteen years. See id
47. See, e.g., Freedom to Marry, at http://www.freedomtomarry.org/ftm_ourmission.htm (last
visited Dec. 19, 2003) (website of the "Freedom to Marry" organization, which states its goal as
winning the freedom for same-sex couples to marry "in at least one state within the next five
years"); Alliance for Marriage, Multicultural CoalitionReintroduces FederalMarriageAmendment
in Congress, at http://www.allianceformarriage.org (last visited Dec. 19, 2003) (website of the
"Alliance for Marriage" organization, whose aim is to amend the United States Constitution to
define marriage as solely heterosexual).
48. James Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a UnifiedField Theory of the Family: The American Law
Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. REv. 923, 925 (2001).
49. Unmarried opposite-sex couples break up at a higher rate than spouses and live together
for a briefer period than married couples. See Larry Bumpass & Hsien-Hen Lu, Trends in
Cohabitationand Implicationsfor Children'sFamily Contexts in the United States, 54 POPULATION
STUD. 29, 33 (2000); Jay D. Teachman etal., Legal Status and the Stability of CoresidentialUnions,
28 DEMOGRAPHY 571, 583 (1991). Even those cohabitants who later many experience a greater
incidence of divorce than spouses who did not cohabit before marriage. See William G. Axinn &
Arland Thornton, The Relationship Between Cohabitation and Divorce: Selectivity or Causal
Influence?, 29 DEMOGRAPHY 357, 358 (1992); Lee A. Lillard et al., PremaritalCohabitation and
Subsequent Marital Dissolution: A Matter of Self-Selection?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 437, 438 (1995);
see also generally LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY
MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETtER-OFF FINANCIALLY (2000).

50. It is difficult to improve on William 0. Douglas' paean to marriage:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate
to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes;
a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). Marilynne Robinson took a different tack,
suggesting that the non-meritocratic aspects of the biological family serve a function in providing
respite even to those perceived as socially unworthy:
I think the biological family is especially compelling to us because it is, in fact, very
arbitrary in its composition. I would never suggest so rude an experiment as calculating
the percentage of one's relatives one would actually choose as friends, the percentage of
one's relatives who would choose one as their friend. And that is the charm and the
genius of the institution. It implies that help and kindness and loyalty are owed where
they are perhaps by no means merited.
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or domestic unions provide the most nurturing homes for children. 51
Society benefits from the moral, spiritual, and economic strength
generated by marital unions exhibiting an ethos of caring. 52 And history
matters. As Nancy Cott has demonstrated, "[fjrom the founding of the
United States to the present day, assumptions about the importance of
marriage53and its appropriate form have been deeply implanted in public
policy.
Not surprisingly, one of the fonts of contemporary marriage reform
has been the glut of divorces and the call to arms that many have heeded
to reinvigorate the marital institution. The drumbeat during the "divorce
counterrevolution" over the adverse effects of divorce has been

MARILYNNE ROBINSON, THE DEATH OF ADAM: ESSAYS ON MODERN THOUGHT 87-88 (1998).
Robert Frost echoed that point in his memorable line, "'Home is the place where, when you have to
go there, / They have to take you in."' Robert Frost, The Death of the Hired Man, in COMPLETE
POEMS OF ROBERT FROST 49, 53 (Holt, Rinehart & Winston eds. 1967) (1916).
51. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, POSITION STATEMENT ON ADOPTION AND CO-PARENTING
OF CHILDREN BY SAME-SEX COUPLES (Nov. 2002):

Numerous studies over the last three decades consistently demonstrate that children
raised by gay or lesbian parents exhibit the same level of emotional, cognitive, social,
and sexual functioning as children raised by heterosexual parents. This research indicates
that optimal development for children is based not on the sexual orientation of the
parents, but on stable attachments to committed and nurturing adults. The research also
shows that children who have two parents, regardless of the parents' sexual orientations,
do better than children with only one parent.
Id.; see also Ellen C. Perrin, M.D. et al., Technical Report: Coparent or Second-ParentAdoption by
Same-Sex
Parents,
109
PEDIATRICS
341
(2002),
available
at
http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/content/full/pediatrics;109/2/341
(last visited Jan. 16,
2004); COMM. ON GAY AND LESBIAN ISSUES, AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N, POSITION STATEMENT
ON GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTING (2002).
52. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil SocietyRevivalists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301, 334 (2000) (noting that efforts to revitalize civil society
catalog conjugal, two-parent families as the most essential seedbeds of civic virtue upon which
successful social reproduction depends). The Marriage Movement, a pro-marriage coalition, asserts
in its "Statement of Principles" that "the decline of marriage weakens civil society and spreads
social
inequality."
Marriage Movement, A Statement of Principles (2000), at
http://www.marriagemovement.org/html/report.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2003). Partisans on both
sides of the debate over recognition of same-sex unions often proclaim marriage as a foundational
social institution. Compare NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE
NATION 217-19 (2000) (citing the views of many who defend heterosexual marriage against the
intrusion of gays and lesbians into the institution), with Andrew Sullivan, Here Comes the Groom:
A (Conservative) Casefor Gay Marriage,NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 28, 1989, at 20-21
(Legalizing gay marriage would offer homosexuals the same deal society now offers
heterosexuals: general social approval and specific legal advantages in exchange for a
deeper and harder-to-extract-yourself-from commitment to another human being. Like
straight marriage, it would foster social cohesion, emotional security, and economic
prudence. Since there's no reason gays should not be allowed to adopt or be foster
parents, it could also help nurture children.).
53. COTT,supra note 52, at 2.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss1/3

12

DiFonzo: Unbundling Marriage
UNBUNDLING MARRIAGE

2003]

unrelenting. 4 Initially, this widespread cultural campaign primarily
targeted the booming divorce rate, and sought ways to slow the rush to
divorce court.5 5 In its present second stage, the movement has
reconfigured the family dilemma, shifting the target from confounding
easy divorce to maintaining a good marriage.5 6 The struggle over
defining a "good" marriage has ineluctably led to an epistemological
battle over marriage itself. What constitutes a marriage? The next
section of this Essay considers anew the elements of marriage.

II.

BUNDLING THE ELEMENTS OF MARRIAGE

Two tidal waves crashed our cultural shores following the no-fault
divorce earthquake. One flood brought with it an excess of autonomy,
both individual and, as I shall argue, nuptial. Coming in its wake, the
other torrent has sought to wash away the genie of marital freedom.
Neither has triumphed. But their vortex may well lead to a radically
different way to conceptualize marriage. No-fault divorce was intended
in large part to reverse rising divorce rates by eliminating the quick and
easily-obtainable fault grounds and instead ushering dissolution-minded
spouses into reconciliation programs.5 7 The effort failed, primarily
because the legal engine of divorce had actually been fueled by mutual
54. See, e.g., James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage,75 IND. L.J. 875, 905-33 (2000)
(discussing the divorce "counterrevolution").
55. Proposals included a variety of zigzagging alternatives: "restoration of fault as the
exclusive dissolution ground; raising the bar of divorce for couples with children; delaying the
process of obtaining divorces; and mandating or encouraging anti-divorce counseling and education
at both the prenuptial and pre-divorce stages." Id. at 881.
56. The Council on Families in America announced this focal shift from the death of marriage
to its revival:
The divorce revolution-the steady displacement of a marriage culture by a culture of
divorce and unwed parenthood-has failed. It has created terrible hardships for children,
incurred unsupportable social costs, and failed to deliver on its promise of greater adult
happiness. The time has come to shift the focus of national attention from divorce to
marriage and to rebuild a family culture based on enduring maritalfrelationships.
COUNCIL ON FAMILIES IN AM., MARRIAGE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 293 (David
Popenoe et al. eds., 1995). This transition may also be seen in the phrasing of the titles of noted
social researcher Judith Wallerstein's three volumes reporting her study of the impact of divorce on
children: from SURVIVING THE BREAKUP (1980) (with Joan Berlin Kelly) to SECOND CHANCES:
MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN AFTER DIVORCE (1989) (with Sandra Blakeslee) to THE GOOD
MARRIAGE: HOW AND WHY LOVE LASTS (1995) (with Sandra Blakeslee); see also Marriage
Movement, supra note 52 (describing a new "grass-roots movement to strengthen marriage" which
posits that the divorce revolution has failed, both in terms of the victimization of children and of the
disappointed expectations of adults who divorced in order to escape unhappy domestic unions. The
Marriage Movement also decries the "unwed-childbearing revolution has failed" which it blames
for the "feminization of both parenting and poverty.").
57. SeeDiFONZO,supranote 25, at 112, 115, 117-18.
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consent, not fault. But now no-fault had done away with the need for
consent, and the result-in most states-was unilateral divorce. 58 This
revolution in divorce law initially effected a significant alteration in the
institution of marriage, transforming it from the constitutive family
entity to a partnership of individuals.5 9
A. NegotiatingLimits on Individualism
But the pendulum of divorce law has swung at last partially back.
Once the state largely retreated from the enforcement of fault-driven exit
rules to marriage, connubially-minded individuals increasingly began to
bargain, ab initio, their own terms of disengagement.6 ° Prenuptial
contracting, quite rare before the era of no-fault, has blossomed in
popularity. 61 Broader legal and cultural acceptance of couples'
bargaining before marriage has led to the related phenomenon of
"postnuptial" contracts, in which the couple decides on property division
and other issues after exchanging vows, but not in contemplation of
divorce. 62 These developments have had some remarkable if oftunrecognized consequences. Ever-more-common injections of contract
law principles have largely transformed what had once been the status-

58. Seeid.at 172.
59. See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition. From Griswold to Eisenstadt and
Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1520 (1994) (studying "the shift from a world in which domestic
relations are founded in a hierarchical ideology that manifests natural differences in the actual
relationships between people to a world in which domestic relations are founded in an egalitarian
ideology that presumes the autonomy of the individual within a world of contract").
60. Two recent proposals have even called for marriage partners to have substantial power
over choice of law issues. See Brian H. Bix, Choice of Law and Marriage.A Proposal, 36 FAM.
L.Q. 255, 255 (2002); F. H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV.561, 568-71 (2001).
61. See Rachel Emma Silverman, Don't Like Your Prenup? Blame Barry Bonds, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 9, 2003, at Dl (observing that such "contracts have become increasingly popular among
couples of all ages and incomes who want to set their own marital rules"); Jenifer Warren,
Protections Added to Prenuptial Pacts, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, pt. 2, at 1 (reporting on
protective measures adopted to California law in light of the increasing profusion of prenuptial
agreements, requiring that a spouse have seven days to sign a premarital deal, that a person waiving
alimony be represented by counsel, and that a spouse must receive a full explanation of contract
terms in his or her native language); see generally Brian H. Bix, PremaritalAgreements in the ALI
Principles of Family Dissolution, 8 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 231 (2001).
62. See Tamar Lewin, Among Nuptial Agreements, Post- Has Now Joined Pre-, N.Y. TIMES,
July 7, 2001, at Al; Pamela Yip, Married? Consider a Postnup, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003, at
F6. "Postnuptial" agreements, which have also recently mushroomed, differ from the older
separation and property settlement agreements in that the latter are generally negotiated as a prelude
to dissolution. See JOHN DE WITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW § 4.05, at 10304 (2d ed. 2001).
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centered realm of domestic relations.63 But the spread of bargaining
theory in family law may in fact succeed in trimming the muchcriticized excesses of the individualism inherent in no-fault divorce.
The paradox of our contemporary divorce regime is that, while
individuals may leave a marriage without mutual consent, it takes two to
tangle with a prenuptial agreement.64 The transformation is far from
complete, as the absolute number of prenuptial contracts is still
relatively low, but a progress report must make mention of the return, in
many instances, of mutual consent as the running motor of divorce. Plus
ca change, plus c'est la meme chose: the divorce uprising of the latetwentieth and early-twenty-first century may yet complete a
circumnavigation of the legal and cultural globe, leaving divorcing
spouses once again jointly in charge of their fate. Despite cultural laxity
and communitarian doomsayers, individualism is never unfettered for
63. A glimpse of the astonishing distance traveled down this road by family law may be seen
in this excerpt from a 1930 Colorado Supreme Court opinion denouncing and voiding a couple's
attempt to modify a marriage contractually by providing that, in the event of a separation, the
husband pay the wife one hundred dollars per year of married life in settlement of her property and
alimony claims:
The antenuptial contract was a wicked device to evade the laws applicable to
marriage relations, property rights, and divorces, and is clearly against public policy and
decency. It was nothing more, in effect, than an attempt, on the part of the [husband], in
whose favor the contract was drawn, to legalize prostitution, under the name of marriage,
at the price of [one hundred dollars] per year. It was the establishing of a companionate
marriage, to exist only so long as neither party objected to a continuance. The wife,
under its terms, was made a base hireling. The man could enjoy her companionship,
under its covenant, for a single night, and then discard her, or he might continue his
companionship with her for a week, or a fortnight, or longer if it pleased his fancy, and
then he could, under its terms, capriciously and arbitrarily reject her, and put her adrift
by paying the price, at the rate of [one hundred dollars] per year; and thereupon, at his
bidding, she must gather up her personal belongings and leave the house within [twentyfour] hours, without any rights, either as wife or widow, and then, as a finale, she would
be obliged silently to submit to his action of divorce, without a right to contest the same
in court, no matter how vile, false, or unjust the charges made against her reputation or
character.
The contract is utterly void. It is against public policy. The marriage relation lies at
the foundation of our civilization. Marriage promotes public and private morals, and
advances the well-being of society and social order. The sacred character of the marriage
relation is indissoluble, except as authorized by legislative will and by the solemn
judgment of a court. It cannot be annulled by contract, or at the pleasure of the parties.
Popham v. Duncan (In re Duncan's Estate), 285 P. 757, 757-58 (Colo. 1930). It is a measure of the
gendered universe of family law that a court of that era could only conceive of a prenuptial
agreement as converting the wife into a prostitute.
64. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1999) (stating that an action for divorce
can be maintained by either the husband or wife); What Are the Key Elements Necessaryfor a Valid
Agreement?, at http://family-law.freeadvice.com/premarital-agreement/key elements.htm (last
visited Jan. 19, 2004) (stating that a prenuptial agreement must generally be signed by both the
husband and wife).
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long. In marriage and divorce, nuptial autonomy may well overpower
individual might.
My argument demurs from those writers who view individualism as
the ersatz capstone of the course of American life in recent decades.65
Similarly, it ventures a partial dissent from a portion of Henry Maine's
celebrated thesis about the ineluctable movement from status to contract.
Maine posited that the "individual is steadily substituted for the Family,
as the unit of which civil laws take account., 66 He continued:
Nor is it difficult to see what is the tie between man and man which
replaces by degrees those forms of reciprocity in rights and duties
which have their origin in the Family. It is Contract. Starting, as from
one terminus of history, from a condition of society in which all the
relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, we seem
to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in67 which all
these relations arise from the free agreement of individuals.
The rise of contract certainly parallels the ascendancy of individual
freedom in law. But the continuing infusion of contractual norms into
marital relations will also serve, at least in part, to render individual
action subservient to the will of the nuptial pair. Contractual
understandings allow for greater individual scope of action, but still
"[e]very contract reduces freedom., 68 The maverick impulse driving
marital bargains collides with the desire to limit future individualism at
the heart of contract. In this way, the no-fault revolution has sprouted the
seeds of its own Thermidorian reaction, as couple-crafted covenants
begin to organize the escape from the excessive freedom of no-fault
divorce.
At the same time as prenuptial contracts began to proliferate, the
divorce counterrevolution zeroed in on the surging divorce rates of the
last third of the twentieth century. Concerned with what they perceived
65.

Cf

ROBERT N.

BELLAH

ET AL.,

HABITS OF

THE HEART:

INDIVIDUALISM

AND

COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 6 (1985) (decrying the cultural rifts in American society which
"leave the individual suspended in glorious, but terrifying, isolation"); MILTON C. REGAN, JR.,
FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 2 (1993) (suggesting that the cultural primacy of

detachment has produced the "acontextual self," a being "who stands apart from any social
relationship in which he or she is involved"); Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in
Family Law: The Waning of Belonging, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) (discussing how family law

fosters "autonomous individualism" to the detriment of familial relationships).
66. SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 163 (N.Y., Henry Holt & Co. 1884).
67. Id. For a modem view of the continuing impact of Henry Maine's thought in family law,
see David Westfall, Forcing Incidents of Marriage on Unmarried Cohabitants: The American Law
Institute's Principles of Family Dissolution, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 1476-78 (2001).
68. Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil ofIgnorance: Personalizing the
Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 466 (1998).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss1/3

16

DiFonzo: Unbundling Marriage

UNBUNDLING MARRIAGE

2003]

as the collapse of moral values, these reformers against no-fault
denounced a "divorce culture" 69 whose aim was the "the abolition of
marriage." 70 Seeking to transform our society into one supportive of
stronger families, they then honed the tools to reinforce the marital
contract in the most conservative way possible: they defined marriage
exclusively in heterosexual terms, and they employed legal craft and
cultural cunning to promote life-long marriages between men and
women. 71

69. BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE (1997). Whitehead's book had its
genesis in her influential 1993 article, Dan Quayle Was Right, ATLANTIC, Apr. 1993, at 47
[hereinafter Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right]. In that piece, Whitehead argued that Americans in
the 1970s largely destigmatized divorce because the mores had shifted from protecting children's
well-being to pursuing adult happiness. See id at 52.
70.

MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE: HOW WE DESTROY LASTING LOVE

(1996). Some of these critics sounded apocalyptic alarums. See, e.g., id. at 3-4 ("The overthrow of
the marriage culture and its replacement by a postmarital culture is the driving force behind almost
all of the gravest problems facing America-crime, poverty, welfare dependence, homelessness,
educational stagnation, even child abuse."); COUNCIL ON FAMILIES IN AMERICA, MARRIAGE IN

AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 4 (1995) (warning that our failure to halt the erosion of
marriage "is nothing less than an act of cultural suicide").
"Abolition of marriage" rhetoric has its own politico-linguistic history. Contemporary
concern about the demise of marriage flows from an altogether different font than the same
expression a century ago. When John Beverley Robinson wrote "The Abolition of Marriage"
slightly more than a hundred years before Maggie Gallagher penned her identically named tract, his
target was the legal prison marriage represented in the Victorian era: "Marriage is the privilege
conferred by law, which is in the end by force, by which one person holds the person or the property
of another against their will." John Beverley Robinson, The Abolition of Marriage, LIBERTY, July
20, 1889, at 6-7, available at http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHillI6181/abolmar.htm (last visited
Jan. 19, 2004); see also BARBARA GOLDSMITH, OTHER POWERS: THE AGE OF SUFFRAGE,
SPIRITUALISM, AND THE SCANDALOUS VICTORIA WOODHULL 274 (1998) (describing Victoria

Woodhull's comparable "war upon marriage").
71.

See, e.g., DAN QUAYLE & DIANE MEDVED, THE AMERICAN FAMILY: DISCOVERING THE

VALUES THAT MAKE US STRONG 2 (1996) ("America has truly reached a new consensus" to
"support the unified model of father, mother, and child."); Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right,
supra note 69, at 48 ("The social arrangement that has proved most successful in ensuring the
physical survival and promoting the social development of the child is the family unit of the
biological mother and father."); Maggie Gallagher, Fatherless Son Champions Marriage, N.Y.
POST, Sept. 1, 2000, available at http://www.allianceformarriage.org/press/MaggieGallager.htm
(last visited Dec. 24, 2003) (objecting to the characterization of family breakdown as "family
diversity"). The Alliance for Marriage displays its motto as "More Children Raised in a Home with
Mission Statement, at
Marriage,
Alliance
for
a
Father."
and
a Mother
http://www.allianceformarriage.org (last visited Dec. 24, 2003). The organization's mission
statement expresses its "dedicat[ion] to promoting marriage and addressing the epidemic of
fatherless families in the United States." Id.
This revanchist argument has not gone unchallenged. Where some see a surrender of
moral values in the divorce-friendly culture, others apprehend a "new morality" in the reshaping of
family structure. See Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV.
225, 228 (1997). Supporters of pluralistic family configurations maintain that moral discourse about
the family has not disappeared. Rather, it has diverged from a focus on "fault, sexuality, and
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The Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") 72 and the Covenant

Marriage statutes exemplify this double-barreled campaign.73 DOMA
provided a mandatory gloss on all federal laws and regulations by

directing that marriage "means only a legal union between one man and
one woman as husband and wife.

'7 4

The Covenant Marriage statutes

similarly posit a union between "one male and one female who
understand and agree that the marriage between them is a lifelong
relationship." 75 Both measures thus take up arms against the "Campaign
to Redefine Marriage,"

76

the phrase used by those who oppose same-sex

patriarchal privileges" within families comprising of two married parents of opposite sex and their
biological offspring, shifting to a consideration of "fairness, equity, and caregiving" within
"kinships of responsibility." Id. at 228-29; see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "It All Depends on
What You Mean by Home ": Toward a Communitarian Theory of the "Nontraditional" Family,
1996 UTAH L. REV. 569, 587 (1996); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Familyfrom the
Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809, 816 (1998) (favoring "respect or moral accommodation for
a broad range of family forms that are capable of providing nurturing environments to its
members").
72. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (1996)) (defining marriage for purpose of federal law as exclusively heterosexual,
thus barring federal court or agency recognition of same-sex marriage in federal law).
73. Covenant marriage statutes were drafted with the specific goal of converting "a 'culture of
divorce' to a 'culture of marriage."' Joel A. Nichols, Comment, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage
Law: A First Step Toward a More Robust Pluralismin Marriageand Divorce Law?, 47 EMORY L.J.
929, 929 (1998) (quoting State Rep. Tony Perkins, sponsor of Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Law).
Covenant marriage options are at present available in Arizona, Arkansas, and Louisiana. See ARIz.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901 to -906 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-801 to 811 (Michie 2002 & Supp. 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272-9:275.1 (West 2000 & Supp.
2002).
74. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000). Congress further defined the term "spouse" in any federal act or
agency rule to refer "only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife." Id.In 2001 and
2002, the Federal Marriage Amendment, described as "the best and most realistic chance we have to
preserve and protect traditional marriage," was introduced in the House of Representatives in an
effort to inscribe DOMA into the Constitution. See Stanley Kurtz, Marriage'sBest Chance, NAT'L
REV. ONLINE (Aug. 16, 2001), at http://www.nationalreview.com/contributors/kurtz08l60l.shtm.
The text of the amendment read as follows:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.
Neither this Constitution or the constitution of any State, nor state or federal law, shall be
construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon
unmarried couples or groups.
H.R.J. Res. 93, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002). The bill died in committee.
75. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:272(A) (West 2000). In general, covenant marriage laws allow a
couple to opt out of the generally applicable no-fault divorce law and agree to terms which will
make it more difficult for them to later divorce.
76. David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Reaffirming Marriage: A Presidential
Priority, 24 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 623, 627 (2001). Coolidge and Duncan warned that the
legalization of same-sex "marriage" is being effected by way of a "court-ordered redefinition of
marriage analogous to Roe v. Wade." Id. (footnote omitted).
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conjugal unions,
fearing "unprecedented, disastrous effects, especially
77
on children.,

The 1864 edition of Joel Prentiss Bishop's authoritative family law
treatise defined marriage as "one man and one woman united in law for
life" in a civil status whose source was "the law of nature. 78 A
generation later, James Schouler's treatise explained that the rights and
obligations of the marital status "are fixed by society in accordance with
principles of natural law, and are beyond and above the parties
themselves. 79 Both DOMA and Covenant Marriage represent
Procrustean efforts to retrofit modem domestic unions to the standards
of the world of Bishop and Schouler, with policy arguments and social
80
science research on marital stability replacing reliance on natural law.
Ostensibly, they aim to strengthen marriage. But the cultural and legal
battles over marriage and its simulacra are likely to result in an
unintended, but almost unavoidable, consequence.
B. Bundles of MaritalRights and ObligationsI: Civil Unions
In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court issued "the most
closely-watched opinion in [its] history" 81 in a case involving the denial
of marriage licenses to three same-sex couples. These sets of partners
had lived together in committed relationships for periods ranging from
four to twenty-five years, and two of the couples had raised children
together.82 Acknowledging the "deeply-felt religious, moral, and
political beliefs" which swirled around the issue, the court decided that
the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution required the
state to extend to same-sex couples the benefits and protections that its
laws provide to opposite-sex married couples.83 Rather than directing the

77. Id. at 634 (footnote omitted); see also Stanley Kurtz, Love and Marriage, NAT'L REV.
ONLINE (July 30, 2001), at http://www.nationalreview.com/contributors/kurtz073001.shtml
(arguing that if marriage is extended to homosexual unions, "it is children who will pay the price").
78.

1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 3

(4th ed. 1864).
79.

JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 1073, at

1346 (5th ed. 1895).
80. On the continuing influence of natural law thinking upon contemporary family law, see
generally J. Herbie DiFonzo, Legislating in the Shadow of Nature, 11 GOOD SOc'Y 84 (2002)
(reviewing NANCY F. CoTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000)).

81. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999) (Dooley, J., concurring).
82. See id. at 867.
83. Id. at 867-77. The Common Benefits Clause reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and
security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the particular emolument or
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issuance of marriage licenses, however, the court left to the state
legislature "[w]hether [the remedy shall be] ...inclusion within the
marriage laws themselves or a parallel84'domestic partnership' system or
some equivalent statutory alternative.,
In its opinion, the Vermont court quickly dispensed with most of
the rationales the State had advanced in support of limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples. 85 The court focused its analysis on whether a
crucial link between marriage and both procreation and child-rearing had
been established. 86 In doing so, it responded to the State's three-pronged
argument. The State had pressed its interest "in promoting a permanent
commitment between couples who have children to ensure that their
offspring are considered legitimate and receive ongoing parental
support., 87 The State also contended that the legislature could
reasonably have feared that "sanctioning same-sex unions 'would
diminish society's perception of the link between procreation and child
advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that
community.
VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7.
In 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that "barring an individual from
the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that person would marry a
person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution." Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
84. Baker, 744 A.2d at 867. The court added that "[w]hatever system is chosen, however,
must conform with the constitutional imperative to afford all Vermonters the common benefit,
protection, and security of the law." Id.One justice concurred with the holding, id at 889-97
(Dooley, J., concurring), while another justice filed a partial concurrence and dissent, objecting to
the majority's opinion as advisory, see id. at 897-912 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Instead of referring the matter to the legislature for it to craft an appropriate remedy, Justice
Johnson would have enjoined the State from denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples. See id.
at 898.
85. See id. at886. Specifically, the Supreme Court dismissed the State's asserted interests in
"'promoting child rearing in a setting that provides both male and female role models,"' simplifying
surrogacy contracts and sperm donors, "'bridging differences' between the sexes, providing
disincentives for marriages of convenience attributable to tax, housing or other benefits, preserving
inter-jurisdictional marriage law uniformity, and generally safeguarding marriage from
"'destabilizing change."' Id. at 884 (quoting State's brief). The court reasoned that the State's claim
that its laws supported a privileged position for opposite-sex couples with regard to child-rearing
was belied by the legislative policy granting same-sex couples equality with their heterosexual
counterparts in the areas of adoption, child support, and the regulation of parent-child contact after
dissolution of a relationship. See id. at 886. The court found no evidence of a legislative preference
for uniformity with other states' marriage laws. See id at 885. The court rejected as speculative the
State's claims that recognizing same-sex unions might promote marriages of convenience or
otherwise adversely affect the institution of marriage. See id. Finally, the court rejected the State's
claim that the long history of intolerance of same-sex intimacies mandates continued
constitutionally unequal treatment of same-sex unions. See id.
86. Seeid.at881.
87. Id.(quoting the brief of the State Attorney General).
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rearing... [and] advance the notion that fathers or mothers ... are mere

surplusage to the functions of procreation and child rearing."' 88 Finally,
the State pointed to the inability of same-sex couples to procreate on
their own, and argued that sanctioning such unions "'could be seen by
the Legislature to separate further the connection89 between procreation
and parental responsibilities for raising children."'
Unquestionably, marriage has historically meant the "joining of the
two sexes into a community that connects the generations." 9 Half a
century ago, the United States Supreme Court affirmed that "[m]arriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race." 9' But the Vermont court chose to address whether this historic
linkage still reflected social reality. This question devolved into two
related lines of inquiry-has society countenanced means other than
through the heterosexual marital union to procreate and raise children;
and has marriage acquired other central meanings which should be
legally sanctioned.
The Baker court found that the State undeniably had a convincing
and enduring interest in championing a "permanent commitment
between couples for the security of their children.' '92 To that end, state
sanctioning of the unions of those capable of having children was
eminently justified. But the court observed that the secular blessings of
marriage are unreservedly also extended to heterosexual couples who
never intend to have children, as well as to those incapable of
procreating. 93 Thus, the link between marriage and procreation is
88. Id.
89. Id.
90.

Coolidge & Duncan, supranote 76, at 639.

91.

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).

92. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt.1999).
93. See id; accord Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2498 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)

(recognizing that "the encouragement of procreation" is not a strong argument in support of limiting
marriage to heterosexuals, "since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry"). The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court similarly rejected the connection between marriage and
child-bearing:
Our laws of civil marriage do not privilege procreative heterosexual intercourse between
married people above every other form of adult intimacy and every other means of
creating a family. [State law] contains no requirement that the applicants for a marriage
license attest to their ability or intention to conceive children by coitus. Fertility is not a
condition of marriage, nor is it grounds for divorce. People who have never
consummated their marriage, and never plan to, may be and stay married.
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003). In its recent decision
invalidating the common law limitation of marriage to heterosexuals, the Court of Appeals for
Ontario held that the government had failed to show a rational connection between the opposite-sex
requirement in marriage and the encouragement of procreation and childrearing. "The ability to
'naturally' procreate and the willingness to raise children are not prerequisites of marriage for
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"significantly under-inclusive." 94 Conversely, same-sex parents are
increasingly engaged in raising a considerable number of children, with
many such couples conceiving a growing number of children through the
varied methodologies of assisted reproduction.9 5 The marriage statutes
thus exclude many who, through their conduct in rearing children whom
they have brought into the world, are fulfilling one of the goals of
96
marriage even though they are prevented from enjoying its protection.
The court then turned to the question whether the essence of
marriage has expanded beyond the responsibility for bearing and raising
children. 97 It began with the historically-grounded avowal that marriage
legally includes, but is not limited to, the contractual undertaking of the
parties. 98 The "value-added" by the societal imprimatur is considerable,
opposite-sex couples. Indeed, many opposite-sex couples that marry are unable to have children or
choose not to do so." Halpern v. Canada (A.G.), [2003] 225 D.L.R.4th 529, 566.
The Ontario court elaborated on the weakness of the rationale linking marriage to
procreation and child raising:
Importantly, no one, including the [Attorney General of Canada], is suggesting that
procreation and childrearing are the only purposes of marriage, or the only reasons why
couples choose to marry. Intimacy, companionship, societal recognition, economic
benefits, the blending of two families, to name a few, are other reasons that couples
choose to marry.... [S]ame-sex couples are capable of forming "long, lasting, loving
and intimate relationships." Denying same-sex couples the right to marry perpetuates the
contrary view, namely, that same-sex couples are not capable of forming loving and
lasting relationships, and thus same-sex relationships are not worthy of the same respect
and recognition as opposite-sex relationships.
Id. at 558-59.
94. Baker, 744 A.2d at 881. Concern with children at risk in domestic break-up has led over
the years to an assortment of proposals legally elevating marriages with children over childless
unions. These reforms have almost never been enacted, however, because of concern with
degrading those marriages in which the partners are either incapable of having, or choose not to
bear, children. DiFonzo, supra note 54, at 933 ("[S]ome critics today argue that the public policy
that uplifts families with children does a disservice to childless marriages. The protection afforded
to couples who procreate 'turns the having of children into the real solemnization of the
marriage."') (quoting David M. Wagner, Divorce Reform: An Emerging Issue Laps at Legislative
Shores, WORLD & 1, Jan. 1998, available at http://www.worldandi.com/public/1998/anuary/
wagner.cfm (last visited Jan. 16, 2004).
95. See Baker, 744 A.2d at 881.
96. See id. at 882; accord Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 963 (noting the state's concession that
"people in same-sex couples may be 'excellent' parents.... [who] have children for the reasons
others do-to love them, to care for them, to nurture them," but indicating that "task of child rearing
for same-sex couples is made infinitely harder by their status as outliers to the marriage laws);
Halpern, 225 D.L.R.4th at 558 ("While it is true that, due to biological realties, only opposite-sex
couples can 'naturally' procreate, same-sex couples can choose to have children by other means,
such as adoption, surrogacy and donor insemination. An increasing percentage of children are being
conceived and raised by same-sex couples.") (citation omitted).
97. See Baker, 744 A.2d at 882.
98. See id. at 883; BIsHOP, supra note 78, § 3; SCHOULER, supra note 79, § 1073, at 1346. A
modem and consonant definition may be found in GREGORY ET AL., supra note 62, § 2.03 ("[Tlhere
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for "the marriage laws transform a private agreement into a source of
significant public benefits and protections." 99 The court found that these
public goods are not centered on procreation and child-rearing. 100 To the
contrary, they reflect the cornucopia of public interests at play in the
exercise of the state's regulatory authority. 10 1 These include, for
example, the right to bring a lawsuit for the wrongful death of a
spouse;10 2 the right to receive a portion of the estate of a spouse who dies
intestate; 10 3 the right to bring an action for loss of consortium;1 °4 the
right to workers' compensation survivor benefits; 0 5 the right to spousal
benefits statutorily guaranteed to public employees, including health,
life, disability, and accident insurance; 10 6 the opportunity to be covered
10 7
as a spouse under group life insurance policies issued to an employee;
the opportunity to be covered as the insured's spouse under an individual
health insurance policy;10 8 the right to claim an evidentiary privilege for
marital communications; 0 9 homestead rights and protections;110 the
presumption of joint ownership of property and the concomitant right of
survivorship; 1 hospital visitation and other rights incident to the
medical treatment of a family member;1 12 and, finally, the right to
and
receive, and the obligation to provide, spousal support,11maintenance,
3
property division in the event of separation or divorce.
That the court identified key rights and obligations in relation to
dissolution proceedings is, of course, unremarkable. But, as we shall see,
the state legislature chose to funnel civil union dissolutions into the4
ordinary court processes applicable to the break-ups of marriages."
are three parties to any marriage: Husband, Wife, and the State; and the public policy of the State is
to regulate marriage based upon the general welfare of its citizens.").
99. Baker, 744 A.2d at 883.
100. See id. at 884.
101. See id. at 883-84.
102. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1492 (2002).
103. See id. §§ 401-404; see also id. § 551 (providing protection against disinheritance through
elective share provisions); id. § 903 (granting preference in being appointed as the personal
representative of a spouse who dies intestate).
104. Seeid.tit. 12, § 5431.
105. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 632 (1987).
106. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 631 (1995).
107. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3811 (2001).
108. See id. § 4063.
109. See VT. R. EVID. § 504 (2003).

110. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 105-106, 141-42 (1998).
111. Seeid.§2.
112. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 1852 (2002).
113. See id. tit. 15, §§ 751-752.
114. See id. § 1206 (giving the state's family law courts jurisdiction over civil union
dissolutions, which shall be dictated by the same procedures for dissolving marriages).
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This decision makes the civil union law unique. Most domestic
partnership acts, even when they provide more than symbolic measures,
allow the parties to dissolve their relationship with little or no

consequences.

15

One commentator on marital alternatives prior to civil

unions argued that "[iut is the crucial obligation to share material
assets-not only in good times during the course of a relationship, but in
settling accounts when it ends-that most distinguishes the burdens of
marriage from those imposed by domestic partnership laws in the United
States."1 16

Recognizing that the state must provide appropriate methods for
fairly resolving the child custody, support, and property issues at the
demise of these unions provides another affirmation that they share the
public space allocated to family formation. 117 Modem divorce law
probably deserves at least some of the opprobrium it has garnered for
destabilizing marriage. But divorce also serves several therapeutic ends:

it provides a legally-created and culturally-accepted forum for closure; it
supplies nomenclature for the parties to use in referring to their former
status and its attributes; and it facilitates, in many cases, the parties'
move to a new stage in their individual lives. Same-sex couples normally

115. See Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L.
REv. 15, 42-43 (2000) (describing the obligation of civil union spouses to go to family court
alongside married couples to obtain a divorce as "a first in America"). Professor Eskridge celebrated
civil unions for offering greater stability than domestic partnerships precisely because the latter
"offer much easier exits than marriage does, and ease of exit will undermine the durability of the
relationship." William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Emerging Menu of Quasi-Marriage Options,
FINDLAW'S WRIT (July 7, 2000), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com. New Jersey's recent domestic
partnership law provides an exception to the trend, by providing grounds for termination of the
same-sex partnership similar to the state's divorce grounds. See Joanna Grossman, The New Jersey
Domestic PartnershipLaw, FINDLAW'S WRIT (Jan. 13, 2004), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com
(comparing New Jersey's recent statute with other domestic partnership laws). Domestic partnership
laws are discussed further at text at notes 137-55, infra.
116. Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage?On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family Values by
a "Simulacrum of Marriage," 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1699, 1749 (1998). For example, Hawaii's
reciprocal beneficiary law has been criticized for its "failure to protect individuals in same-sex
relationships from financial hardship once their relationships collapse." W. Brian Burnette, Note,
Hawaii's ReciprocalBeneficiaries Act: An Effective Step in Resolving the Controversy Surrounding
Same-Sex Marriage, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 81, 93 (1998).
117. By no means am I suggesting that "disuniting" civil unions will be a simple task, or one
entirely analogous to dissolving marriages. See, e.g., Associated Press, Houston Judge Dismisses
Gay
Divorce Case, Apr.
2,
2003,
available at http://gaylawnet.com/news/2003/
pa0304.htm#houston. (reporting on Texas judge who initially granted a divorce to a gay couple who
had entered into a Vermont civil union, and then reversed his ruling when the State Attorney
General intervened on the grounds that the court could not grant a divorce where no marriage had
existed); see also generally Joanna Grossman, Vermont Civil Unions: Will Sister States Recognize
Them? An Early Status Report, FINDLAW'S WRIT (May 20, 2003), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com
(discussing the difficulties to be encountered in dissolving civil unions).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss1/3

24

DiFonzo: Unbundling Marriage

2003]

UNBUNDLING MARRIAGE

have access to none of those social or legal benefits. Providing a means
to legally dissolve these unions fills the vacuum experienced by many
same-sex partners whose life partnerships have ended: "When a
recognized comes to an end, it is
relationship that was only marginally
' 18
almost as though it never existed." "
The enumeration in Baker, as the above discussion suggests, does
not exhaust the corpus of "rights, powers, privileges, and responsibilities
triggered by marriage," ' 19 but only illustrates its range and diversity. 20 It
confirms the conclusion expressed by a concurring Justice in Baker that
"the complexity of the current system of government-created benefits
and burdens has made civil marriage a modem-day emolument, a
When
government recognized and supported special status . ,.2"
measured against the formidable array of legal encumbrances and
advantages flowing from a marriage license, the assertion that society
sanctions domestic unions as the cradle of childhood proves to be a

woefully inadequate representation of a far richer tableau. Providing for

118. Kathy Duggan, I Earned This Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1996, in SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE, supranote 30, at 302; id. at 300-02 (describing the author's frustration at lacking access
to divorce after the end of her same-sex relationship:
I find myself wishing our marriage was legal for a reason I never anticipated. I want a
divorce.
What I want is a forum where I can act out all the anger, frustration, and
disappointment of a failed relationship. One where I can hand responsibility for the
haggling over our possessions to a professional... I want a ritual that takes apart our
relationship as deliberately as we put it together);
see also STACEY, supra note 2, at 123 (Married heterosexuals "have the privilege of divorce and we
don't. We're left out there to twirl around in pain.") (quoting a gay lawyer).
119. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 884 (Vt. 1999).
120. See generally Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993), reh'g grantedin part, 875
P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993), appealedafter remandsub nom., Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996),
remanded to Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996), aff'd, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw.
1997); David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriageand the Legal Needs of
Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447 (1996); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Monica
Kirkpatrick Johnson, Legal Planningfor UnmarriedCommitted Partners:Empirical Lessons for a
Preventive and TherapeuticApproach, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 417, 420-28, 456 (1999).
121. Baker, 744 A.2d at 889 (Dooley, J., concurring). In concurring in part and dissenting in
part, Justice Johnson noted:
This case concerns the secular licensing of marriage. The State's interest in licensing
marriages is regulatory in nature. The regulatory purpose of the licensing scheme is to
create public records for the orderly allocation of benefits, imposition of obligations, and
distribution of property through inheritance. Thus, a marriage license merely acts as a
trigger for state-conferred benefits.
Id. at 898-99 (citations omitted).
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the nurture of children is a cardinal obligation of society;122marriage
serves this end, but it satisfies many other social aims as well.
Following Baker v. Vermont, the state legislature passed the "Act
Relating to Civil Unions."' 23 This statute preserved the legal definition
of marriage in heterosexual terms, 124 but made it clear that those who
established a civil union "may receive the benefits and protections and
be subject to the responsibilities of spouses.' ' 125 The statute declared its
intention to render civil unions the legal equivalents of marriage:
"Parties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections and
responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute,
administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other source of
civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage."' 126 The legislature
then promulgated a "list of legal benefits, protections and responsibilities
of spouses,
which shall apply in like manner to parties to a civil
27
union."'0

122. Perhaps marriage's role in the "complexity of the current system of government-created
benefits and burdens," Id. at 889 (Dooley, J., concurring), provides the modem and best answer to
the natural law argument that marriage's central function is to build the state by producing a Worthy
citizenry. Cf CICERO, DE OFFICIS (Walter Miller trans., 1975) (1913):
For since the reproductive instinct is by Nature's gift the common possession of all
living creatures, the first bond of union is that between husband and wife; the next, that
between parents and children; then we find one home, with everything in common. And
this is the foundation of civil government, the nursery, as it were, of the state. ... Then
follow between these, in turn, marriages and connections by marriage, and from these
again a new stock of relations; and from this propagation and after-growth states have
their beginnings.
Id. at 57, 59; see also generally Mark Strasser, NaturalLaw and Same-Sex Marriage,48 DEPAUL L.
REV. 51, 74 (1998) (arguing that all the state's interests in marriage, including "the promotion of
stability, the limitation of the disorganized breakdown of relations, and the provision of a home for
the production and rearing of children," would be furthered by recognizing same-sex unions as
marriages).
123. 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91 (codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (Supp.
2001)).
124. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201(4) (2002) (defining marriage as "the legally
recognized union of one man and one woman").
125. Id. § 1201(2).
126. Id. § 1204(a). The legislature's intention to equalize the status of married person with that
of member of a civil union was articulated in unmistakable terms. See, e.g., id. § 1204(b) ("A party
to a civil union shall be included in any definition or use of the terms 'spouse,' 'family,' 'immediate
family,' 'dependent,' 'next of kin,' and other terms that denote the spousal relationship, as those
terms are used throughout the law."); id. § 1204(c) ("Parties to a civil union shall be responsible for
the support of one another to the same degree and in the same manner as prescribed under law for
married persons."); id. § 1204(d) ("The law of domestic relations, including annulment, separation
and divorce, child custody and support, and property division and maintenance shall apply to parties
to a civil union.").
127. Id. § 1204(e).
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Although the statute describes it as "nonexclusive,"'' 28 the list is a
nearly encyclopedic compendium of the blessings and duties of
marriage. In both their scope and their detail, these rights and
responsibilities constitute the elements of marriage, and supply the frame
of reference for the continuing debate over the rules governing the
entrance, exit, and content of marriage. Because of their importanceand because few statutes so clearly detail the elements of marriage-the
list merits an extensive summary. It includes laws relating to the
acquisition, ownership, and transfer of real and personal property
(including eligibility to hold property as tenants by the entirety);1 29 as
well as tort actions dependent upon spousal status, such as wrongful
death, emotional distress, loss of consortium, or dramshop. 30 Laws
dealing with probate, adoption, certain kinds of group insurance, spouse
abuse programs, prohibitions against discrimination based on marital
status, victim's compensation rights, worker's compensation benefits,
and provisions for affirmance of relationship are also itemized.' 3' Key
health law provisions are included, relating to the provision of medical
care, hospital visitation and notification, terminal care documents,
durable power of attorney for health care execution and revocation, and
the making, revoking and objecting to anatomical gifts by others. 132 Also
covered are family leave and public assistance benefits, as well as laws
relating to immunity from compelled testimony and the marital
communication privilege. 133 The list extends to a surviving spouse's
homestead rights, laws relating to loans to veterans, and the definition of
a family farmer and family landowner rights to fish and hunt. 134 Also
encompassed are certain tax laws, state pay for military service,
application for an absentee ballot, and the legal requirements for
assignments of wages. 35 In addition to this sizable compilation, the
burdens and benefits at stake include those relating to the partners'
mutual economic support, as well as the corpus of domestic relations
custody and
legislation on annulment, separation and divorce, child
36
maintenance.
spousal
and
division
support, and property

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
See id. § 1204(e)(1).
See id.§ 1204(e)(2).
See id. § 1204(e)(3)-(9), (24).
See id.
§ 1204(e)(10)-(1 1), (19).
See id.§ 1204(e)(12), (13), (15).
See id. § 1204(e)(16)-(18), (22).
See id. § 1204(e)(14), (20), (21), (23).
See id. §§ 1204(f), 1204(c), 1204(d), 1205, 1206.
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C. Bundles of Marital Rights and ObligationsII. Domestic Partnership
Ordinancesand PrivatePrograms
Domestic partner benefits have proliferated in recent years. In
contrast to the civil union statute, these municipal ordinances and private
industry plans direct the extension of a portion of the universe of marital
137
attributes to same-sex unions and unmarried heterosexual couples.
Although the advantages afforded by these laws fall short of those
138
provided to members of civil unions, they are far from insubstantial.
Domestic partners may be entitled to health insurance plan participation,
as well as to illness, disability, and bereavement leave. 139 Additionally,
137. See J. Robert Cowan, Note, The New Family Plan: Employee Benefits and the NonTraditional Spouse, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 617 (1994); William C. Duncan, Domestic
PartnershipLaws in the United States: A Review and Critique, 2001 BYU L. REV. 961, 961, 962
(2001); Raymond C. O'Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Responsibility, 32 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 163, 165-66 (1995). While domestic partnership laws have heretofore provided far
fewer than all marriage-type rights, there is no conceptual reason why they may not approach nearparity with marriage. See, e.g., Christopher Lisotta, CaliforniaBill UpgradesGay PartnerRights, at
http://www.gay.com/news/article.html?2003/01/28/1 (Jan. 28, 2003) (describing bill designed to
"grant the state's more than 400,000 same-sex couples nearly all the rights, benefits and obligations
available to heterosexual spouses under state law").
Occasionally, a court will, even in the absence of a domestic partnership ordinance,
decide to extend to unmarried partnerships a right traditionally linked to marriage. For instance, in
Lozoya v. Sanchez, 66 P.3d 948 (N.M. 2003), the New Mexico Supreme Court held that "a claim for
loss of consortium is not limited to marriage partners." Id. at 951. In order to recover, an unmarried
claimant "must prove a close familial relationship with the victim." Id. at 957. In evaluating the
proffered relationship, the trial court must consider a variety of factors:
[T]he duration of the relationship, the degree of mutual dependence, the extent of
common contributions to a life together, the extent and quality of shared experience,
and ... whether the plaintiff and the injured person were members of the same
household, their emotional reliance on each other, the particulars of their day to day
relationship, and the manner in which they related to each other in attending to life's
mundane requirements.
Id. (quoting Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 378 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(alteration in original).
138. See Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and
Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1194-95 (1992)
(sorting the features of domestic partnerships into two clusters, "benefits for partners of municipal
employees and registration of the relationship with city hall"). Symbolism and substance are often
interlaced. As part of New York City's response to the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, it
amended its Domestic Partner Registry "to extend New York City's commitment to recognizing
rights of same sex partners by revising the definition of 'domestic partners' in the administrative
code to include person who have ... entered civil unions or marriages not explicitly recognized by
New York State in other jurisdictions." New York., N.Y., Local Law No. 24 § 1 (2002).
139. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2832-A (2003) (mandating that group or
blanket health insurers make benefits available to domestic partners, "at appropriate rates and under
the same terms and conditions as those benefits... provided to spouses of married certificate
holders covered under a group policy"); ATLANTA, GA., ORDINANCE § 2-858 (1996) (extending
health and dental coverage as well as bereavement leave).
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the public registration provisions may facilitate the granting of hospital
of an officially-sanctioned
visitation rights and may supply proof
140
times.
other
at
needed
when
relationship
Several examples illustrate the "proliferation of domestic
partnership legislation and contractual arrangements."' 14' Atlanta's
Domestic Partnership Benefits Ordinance extends health, dental, sick
leave, and funeral leave benefits to city employees and their registered
domestic partners. 42 San Francisco has passed an ordinance requiring
employers contracting with the city government to offer the same
benefits to employees' domestic partners as they offer to their legal
spouses.1 43 The Hawaii legislature enacted a law regulating "reciprocal
44
beneficiaries," as part of its reaction to the decision in Baehr v. Lewin. 1
Reciprocal beneficiaries may receive health insurance coverage, possess
health care decision-making authority and hospital visitation privileges,
obtain the rights of a spouse in a decedent's estate, and sue for the
wrongful death of their partners. 45 As of 2001, "[e]ight states and 105
city and county governments or quasi-government agencies" provided
benefits, 46including health insurance, to their employees' domestic
partners. 1

140. "Two states and 56 cities and counties have established domestic partner registries."
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE FOR LESBIAN, GAY,

BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER AMERICANS 2001 15 (2001) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE
WORKPLACE], available at http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=WorkLife (last visited Jan.
19, 2004). Although these provisions do not mandate that employers grant benefits to their
employees' domestic partners, "some employers use the registries' definition of domestic partner as
a guide for determining eligibility for their own benefits policies." Id.
141. Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade. Bridging the Private/PublicDistinction, 36
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 108 (2001).
142. See ATLANTA, GA., ORDINANCE § 2-858 (1996). The ordinance survived constitutional
challenge in City of Atlanta v. Morgan, 492 S.E.2d 193 (Ga. 1997).
143. See THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE, supra note 140, at 15.
144. 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (indicating that the state law limiting marriage to
heterosexual couples was subject to strict scrutiny constitutional analysis). See Hawaii Reciprocal
Beneficiaries Act, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 2786, Act 383 (H.B. 118) (1997) (codified at HAW. REV.
STAT., §§ 72C-1 to -7 (Supp. XII 2001) and in other diverse code sections). This law was primarily
intended to extend to registrants rights against third parties similar to those afforded to spouses. See
HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-2 (Supp. XII 2001).
145. See H.B. 118, 1997 Leg., 19th Sess. (Haw. 1997).
146. THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE, supra note 140, at 6. Although no federal domestic
partnership law has been enacted, the Department of Interior and Department of State have been
praised as "models" in ensuring that:
[E]quitable benefits and privileges are granted to all employees, including relocation
benefits, access to facilities and services, domestic partner visas, bereavement leave,
insurance coverage, access to Government resources (e.g., meeting space, electronic
bulletin boards, the Department/Agency website, administrative leave), and overall equal
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Developments pioneered in private industry sometimes propel
public policy, and "may ultimately have even more impact than
litigation or legislation in producing the circumstances to secure
recognition of same-sex partners." 147 Professor Lynn D. Wardle, an
opponent of extending domestic partnership benefits to same-sex
couples, has noted that the creation and dissemination of these
entitlements in the private sector "signals a notable change in social
mores." 148 On all levels of government and throughout private industry,
domestic partner benefits are becoming more common: From August
1999 to August 2001, the number of public and private employers
providing such benefits in the United States increased by fifty percent,
from 2,856 employers to 4,285, including many of the largest corporate
employers. 149 Some commentators have criticized domestic partnership
laws for only partially incorporating marital benefits. 50

treatment of GLBT [gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered] couples wherever
possible.
Federal GLOBE (Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender Employees of the Federal Government),
FederalGLOBE Best PracticesChecklist: Creatinga Model Workplacefor All FederalEmployees,
at http://www.fedglobe.org/issues/eoI3087/checklist.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2003).
147. Arthur S. Leonard, Ten PropositionsAbout Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partners,30
CAP. U. L. REv. 343, 355 (2002); see also Rene6 M. Scire & Christopher A. Raimondi, Employment
Benefits: Will Your Significant Other Be Covered?, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 357, 376 (2000)
(tracing the genesis of the domestic partnership movement to the agreement in 1982 by the
publisher of the Village Voice newspaper in New York City to extend health benefits to same-sex
partners).
148. Lynn D. Wardle, Counting the Costs of Civil Unions: Some PotentialDetrimental Effects
on Family Law, 11 WIDENER J. PuB. L. 401, 409 (2002).
149. See THE STATE OF THE WORKPLACE, supra note 140, at 18; Leonard, supra note 147, at
355 (stating that the expansion of domestic partner benefits in the private sector generally began in
high tech industries and higher education, then spreading to finance, the media, the energy business,
transportation, and the auto industry). Major employers who offer domestic partner benefits to their
lesbian and gay employees include Merrill Lynch, IBM, Walt Disney, Eastman Kodak, Chase
Manhattan Bank, McGraw-Hill, Lockheed Martin, Sun Microsystems, AT&T, American Express,
Nike, Reebok, Gap, Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler. See Partners Task Force for Gay &
Lesbian Couples, Private Employment Benefits, at http://buddybuddy.com/d-p-pri.html (Aug.
2003); Peters, supra note 31; Merrill Lynch to Offer Domestic Partnership Benefits,
http://www.hrc.org/Content/ContentGroups/News Releases/19981/MERRILLLYNCH TO OFFE
RDOMESTICPARTNERSHIP_BENEFITS.htm (Aug. 28, 1998).
150. See, e.g., Christensen, supra note 116, at 1734 ("The much-heralded advent of local
domestic partnership laws ... is mostly about modest symbolic gestures accompanied by few if any
tangible benefits."); Debbie Zielinski, Domestic PartnershipBenefits: Why Not Offer Them to
Same-Sex Partners and UnmarriedOpposite Sex Partners?, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 281, 298 (1999)
("[T]he benefits bestowed upon married couples are far more than those given to individuals living
in a domestic partnership."). The argument in the text does not suggest an equivalency between civil
unions and domestic partnership or reciprocal beneficiary laws. To the contrary, the text celebrates
that they are different, that distinct combinations of the elements of marriage may achieve diverse
policy aims.
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In its Principles,the ALL has included a chapter governing inter se
claims of domestic partners. 15 1 The ALI defined domestic partners
broadly to include "two persons of the same or opposite sex, not married
to one another, who for a significant period of time share a primary
residence and a life together as couple."' 52 The Principles aim to achieve
a fair distribution of economic gains and losses between the parties at the
termination of the domestic partnership. 153 While they do not endow
domestic partners with rights vis-A-vis governments or employers, the
ALI Principles treat domestic partnerships as quasi-marriages, thus
furthering the cultural blurring of cohabitation and marriage. Moreover,
by declining to observe any distinction between heterosexual and
homosexual domestic partners, the ALI has effectively registered its
concurrence with the social movement favoring their equivalence. 54
The process of devising and disseminating civil unions and
domestic partnerships is a labor in the vineyard of bundling and
unbundling marriage. The civil union statute aims to package all the
elements of traditional marriage and transpose them into the newlycreated status, which is intended to mirror marriage. The panoply of
domestic ordinances and private plans unbundle the full complement of
marital elements, and install the combination which seems appropriate to
the public or private employer, often achieved after a period of
negotiation. I submit that these illustrations are the beginning of a trend
toward compartmentalizing marriage.
What justifies calling these bundles the "new" elements of
marriage? After all, many of the provisions share a common law
pedigree. Marital status is, moreover, fundamentally woven into our
legal culture. Although the incidents of marriage are generally governed
by state law, the enormous range of such attributes is reflected in a
United States General Accounting Office study which reported that

151.

See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, ch. 6 ("Domestic Partners").

152.

Id. § 6.01(l).

153. See id. § 6.02(1). A secondary purpose of the Domestic Partners chapter is "protection of
society from social-welfare burdens that should be borne.., by individuals." Id. § 6.02(2).
154. Unsurprisingly, the Domestic Partnership chapter of the ALI Principles has generated
controversy. Compare Mark Strasser, A Small Step Forward: The ALI Domestic Partners
Recommendation, 2001 BYU L. REv. 1135, 1136 (2001) (discussing why the ALL Principles
regarding the dissolution of domestic partnerships would not undermine the institutions of marriage
and family), with Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American Law
Institute's "Domestic Partners" Proposal, 2001 BYU L. REv. 1189, 1199 (2001) (discussing
problems with chapter 6 of the ALI Principles).
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55
marital status is a factor in the administration of 1,049 federal laws.1
The sum of these elements comprises the legal content of contemporary
marriage in the United States. To a lesser extent, these elements are also
components of domestic partnerships. The fresh turn taken by family
law may be seen in the varied combinations of the old elements of
marriage in the evolving marriage-like institutions. In its final section,
this Essay contends that focusing on the scope of what elements of
marriage society should allow and require of intimate, committed
couples represents a distinctive way to analyze all domestic unions and
marriages, whether of same- or opposite-sex couples.

III.

EVERY MARRIAGE A "CIVIL UNION"?

This final portion of the Essay undertakes a preliminary sketch of
the impact of bundling principles on the legal construction of
marriage.1 56 The argument thus far has suggested that the campaign for
same-sex marriage (or at a minimum for achieving domestic
partnerships to rival marriage) has begun generating a thorough
reexamination, or even a reconfiguration, of the elements of marriage."
155. See Letter from Barry R. Bedrick, Associate General Counsel, General Accounting
Office, to Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary 1-2 (Jan.
31, 1997).
156. Bundling theory explores the differing effects of grouping elements in various
combinations rather than presenting them individually, whether in a commercial or cultural
marketplace. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL
STATEMENT 299-309 (1980) (presenting a bundling theory of free speech, and applying it to a
proposed economic bill of rights); Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property:
Property as a Web ofInterests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 290 (2002) (noting that "bundle of
rights has caught on as the primary metaphor for property today"); Deanna L. Kwong, The
Copyright-Contract Intersection. SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Systems, Inc. & Bowers v.
Baystate Technologies, Inc., 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 349, 367 (2003) ("Bundling averages demand
over multiple products so as to achieve the most effective price, given the different groups of
consumers. Bundling reduces transaction and enforcement costs by potentially avoiding wasteful
investment in the valuation of the components of a bundle.") (footnotes omitted); Arti K. Rai &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progressof Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 289, 297-98 (2003) (exploring whether "market forces will motivate the emergence of
patent pools and other institutions for bundling intellectual property rights, thereby reducing
transaction costs and permitting the parties to realize gains from exchange") (footnote omitted);
Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in ContractualChoice of Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363,
441 (2003) ("Lawmakers' incentives to condition enforcement of contractual choice on the
contracting parties' residence in the designated state help constrain inefficient enforcement of
contractual choice by bundling choice of residence with the choice of the state's laws.").
157. I am not unmindful of the Sturm und Drang which divides advocates of civil unions and
other same-sex marital alternatives from those who insist that our social and constitutional tenets of
equality demand opening the door marked "marriage" to gays. Champions of same-sex marriage
have derided the civil union as "an unjust, two-tiered apartheid system in which those of us who are
deemed to be abnormal are not to be treated equally under the law." Johnson, supra note 115, at 17
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But the next question asks whether the shifting marital contours affect
only same-sex unions, or do they more broadly adumbrate an alteration
of the social and legal world of the family?
Opponents of affording connubial recognition to gay and lesbian
couples often claim that implementing such nouveau legal regimes
would markedly and adversely affect the traditional heterosexual
marriage. Lynn Wardle has argued that heterosexual marital unions have
appropriately received special legal preference because they make
uniquely valuable contributions to the state, to society, and to
individuals. 158 David Orgon Coolidge and William C. Duncan made the
case that once society extends marriage to same-sex couples, "the core
concept of marriage will be altered:" 5 9
Instead of a unique community, marriage becomes one more
relationship.And why should this relationship be so special? If it has
no necessary connection to children, or even to sex, what makes it
different from an ordinary friendship? Friendships are multiple; why
limit marriage to two persons? Sexual relationships can be multiple;
why promote exclusivity? Relationships come and go, and reasonably
so; why promote permanence? If marriage is a freely chosen
n.12 (quoting Christopher Kaufman, Letters, OUT IN THE MOUNTAINS, July 2000, at 8); see also
James M. Donovan, Baby Steps or One Fell Swoop?: The Incremental Extension ofRights is Not a
Defensible Strategy, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001) (criticizing step-by-step strategy to obtain
equality for same-sex partnerships); Andrew Sullivan, State of the Union: Why "Civil Union " Isn 't
Marriage, NEW REPUBLIC, May 8, 2000, at 18, 22 (criticizing civil unions as inferior to same-sex
marriages); Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, Marrying Apartheid. The Failureof
Domestic PartnershipStatus, at http://www.buddybuddy.com/mar-apar.html (Sept. 2003) ("We
deserve the civil right of marriage, which is otherwise offered to convicted killers, and even to
adulterous, right-wing politicians. We deserve the right to be treated like full, adult citizens.
Demanding instead a statewide or nationwide domestic partnership plan would marry us to an
apartheid."). Other writers have praised the civil union as an adequate political compromise, given
the historic discrimination against gays and lesbians. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality
Practice: Liberal Reflections on the Jurisprudence of Civil Union, 64 ALB. L. REV. 853 (2001);
Greg Johnson, In Praiseof Civil Unions, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 315, 318, 332-33 (2002).
158. See Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a
Retreat from Marriage by Redefining Marriage,39 S. TEX. L. REV. 735, 754 (1998) [hereinafter
Wardle, Legal Claims]. Wardle enumerates the areas in which heterosexual marriages benefit the
public welfare more than homosexual unions: "(1) safe sexual relations, (2) procreation and
childrearing, (3) the status of women, (4) the stability, strength, and security of the family union,
(5) the integrity of the basic unit of society, (6) civic virtue and public morality,
(7) interjurisdictional comity, and (8) government efficiency." Id; see also Lynn D. Wardle,
"Multiply and Replenish ": Considering Same-Sex Marriagein Light of State Interests in Marital
Procreation,24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 771, 775 (2001) (suggesting that "advocates of same-sex
marriage are unlikely to be able to establish that committed same-sex unions are capable of
matching the potential and actual contributions made by heterosexual unions (traditional marriages),
and for that reason same-sex marriage should not be legalized").
159. Coolidge & Duncan, supra note 76, at 639.
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relationship unconnected to sex, children, exclusivity or permanence,
why have legal marriage at all? Why not simply abolish it and let
people create their own contracts? In short, if one removes the reason
for the concept, its other elements come apart. No element, taken
alone, adequately explains the concept of legal marriage.160

Allowing homosexual couples to marry, these authors conclude,
"opens the door to 'polyamory. ' '' 161 Gay marriage destabilizes all
marriage. 162
On the other end of the spectrum, some advocates of the new legal
dispensation praise the recent freedoms in family forms precisely
because of their potential disruption of an institution they see as deeply
flawed. 163 Pointing to the continued subjection of women within a
patriarchal framework they see as unyieldingly oppressive, some
feminists eagerly envisage legalized same-sex marriage as a vehicle "to
destabilize the gendered definition of marriage for everyone."' 64 Judith
Stacey expects the democratization of marriage to foster creative

160. Id.
161. Id. at 639 n.65 (quoting Stanley N. Kurtz, What Is Wrong with Gay Marriage,
COMMENTARY, Sept. 2000, at 35). "Polyamory," a relatively new word, describes relationships in
which "an adult intimately loves more than one other adult." Loving More, About Polyamory, at
http://lovemore.com/aboutpoly (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
162. See Kurtz, supra note 77 ("Marriage springs directly from the ethos of heterosexual sex.
Once marriage loses its connection to the differences between men and women, it can only start to
resemble a glorified and slightly less temporary version of hooking up."); Wardle, Legal Claims,
supra note 158, at 748 (contending that the "integration of the universe of gender differences
(profound and subtle, biological and cultural, psychological and genetic) associated with sexual
identity constitutes the core and essence of marriage"). The accusation that same-sex marriage
would inevitably lead to a diminishment of the commitment at the heart of marriage is virtually
identical to the charge filed against no-fault divorce-that it treats marriage as "notarized dating,"
Dana Milbank, Blame Game: No-Fault Divorce Law is Assailed in Michigan, andDebate Heats Up,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1996, at Al (quoting the Michigan Family Forum), "transform[ing] marriage
into an arrangement of convenience rather than an act of commitment," Gov. Terry Branstad, 1996
Condition of the State Address, reprinted in Iowa "Vibrant and Growing, "DES MOINES REG., Jan.
10, 1996, at Opinion.
163. There are commentators atthe center of this spectrum, of course, who assert that "[flar
from weakening heterosexual marriage, gay marriage would ... help strengthen it, as the culture of
marriage finally embraces all citizens." Andrew Sullivan, Unveiled, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 13, 2001,
at 6, available at http://www.andrewsullivan.com/homosexuality.php?artnum20010813 (last
visited Jan. 19, 2004).
164. Nan D. Hunter, Marriage,Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1LAW & SEXUALITY 9,
12 (1991). Richard Mohr has proposed "social marriage," a loosening of the conjugal bonds with
the aim of achieving the "fused intersection of love's sanctity and necessity's demands." RICHARD
MOHR, A MORE PERFECT UNION: WHY STRAIGHT AMERICA MUST STAND UP FOR GAY RIGHTS 41
(1994). Mohr envisions gay marriage reshaping the institution into a "nurturing ground for social
marriage, and not (as now) as that which legally defines and creates marriage and so precludes legal
examination of it." Id. at 48-50.
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affiliations which will shatter the "customary forms.' ' 16 5 She posits, for
instance, the marriage of two friends who share a mutual commitment
not founded on romantic attraction. 66 And why stop at two? Stacey also
recommends challenging the "dyadic limitations of Western marriage
and seek[ing] some of the benefits of extended family life through small167
group marriages arranged to share resources, nurturance and labor.'
This Essay nominates a different yardstick to measure the changes
in the institution of marriage. Legal provisions regulating domestic
partnerships and civil unions, as well as such innovative documents as
the ALI's recently approved Principles,168 have transformed key
components in the discourse on marriage and divorce. Although not
directly aiming at this target, these legal reforms may succeed in
reconfiguring the terms of the bargain between the state and every
family. Focusing on marriage's functions rather than on its inherent
natural or secular meanings may ultimately shift the public debate away
from whether any particular type of couple fits within the definition of
marriage, and toward a more pragmatic inquiry into whether particular
types of entitlements 69and obligations should be available to all our
domestic households. 1

STACEY, supra note 2, at 127.
166. See id.
167. Id. Note that, although the positions on either end on this ideological continuum posit that
legal recognition of same-sex unions will lead to similar sanctioning of multiple-partner
relationships, there is no logical or experiential connection between these propositions. There has
been no showing that homosexual couples are any more likely than their heterosexual cousins to
extend their amorous unions to multiple partners. Polygamy, as once practiced and sanctioned by
the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints (and as continued by schismatic sects of that
Church) has always involved heterosexual, polygynous marriages. Moreover, the legislative and
judicial efforts to date have excluded the spread to multiple partners. For example, the Vermont
civil union statute mirrored marriage in limiting the civil union to two individuals. See VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (Supp. 2002). Similarly, in invalidating the common-law heterosexual
definition of marriage, the Court of Appeal of Ontario reformulated it as "'the voluntary union for
life of two persons to the exclusion of all others."' Halpem v. Canada (A.G.), [2003] 225 D.L.R.4th
529, 570. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 n.34 (Mass. 2003) (rejecting
the notion that "the restrictions on incestuous or polygamous marriages are so dependent on the
marriage restriction that they too should fall if the marriage restriction falls").
168. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 7.
169. See Chambers, supranote 120, at 450-51 (observing that the debate on same-sex marriage
has pivoted on the symbolism of marriage, rather than the content of the attributes to be fairly
allocated by the state, and arguing that the opponents of extending marriage to gays seem
"motivated not by a view of the inappropriateness of extending particular legal entitlements to
same-sex couples but by views about some 'inherent' meaning of marriage and by views about the
social unacceptability of gay people and gay relationships"). I am not, of course, sanguine that all
those who view same-sex couples' access to the marital institution as a moral dilemma will accede
to my suggestion for an alternate frame of reference. I submit this proposal as an effort to further
dispassionate analysis, well aware that the issue will continue to spark considerable controversy.
165.
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This view of marriage concentrates on considering which elements,
or which bundles of elements, appropriately pertain to specific unions or
types of partnerships. What greater lucidity will this methodology
afford? Seeing marriage in this way may clarify our view of the essential
nature of marriage (by determining which pre-sorted bundle of rights
and responsibilities provides a floor for social recognition), and of the
range of permissible options allocatable by private ordering (by deciding
which elements, or bundles thereof, may be chosen by the parties).
Family law is at present a battleground in which the front lines
between public realm and private choice are particularly contested. The
power of the state to draw the perimeter around marriage has been
70
dramatically weakened, in large measure by actions of the state itself.
But it is not clear that unfettered private ordering will usurp the field, or
that a rational polity would desire such a rococo result.' 71 The question
then becomes how to temper the grasp of contractual freedom by the
reach of the law which defines the limits of that bargaining power. In
other words, although couples will continue to magnify the role of
contract in crafting familial understandings (and misunderstandings),
allocating these bundles of domestic benefits and burdens may become
the primary way for the state to preserve its important channeling
function to "build[], shape[],
sustain[], and promote[]" this key
72
institution of social life. 1

170. For example, prenuptial agreements fixing the financial consequences in the event of
divorce have been praised for their ability to enhance private ordering in an area of law where the
official state regime has failed so many so often. By "empowering couples to commit themselves
reliably, judicial enforcement of premarital [contracts] allows the parties to structure the economic
consequences of future behaviors and, by doing so, to manipulate the incentives they will face in the
future." Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planningfor Divorce, 45 VAND. L. REV. 397, 415-16
(1992) (footnote omitted).
171. See DiFonzo, supra note 54, at 961-62 ("We need legislatures to withhold the legal
imprimatur from radical domestic experimentation, and we need courts to continue to monitor these
agreements for reasonableness, particularly in the emerging area of prenuptial bargains that oh-soconfidently rely on romantic desire to deny future freedom.").
172. Schneider, supra note 6, at 496; see also Chambers, supra note 120, at 448 (concluding
that
[T]he number of significant distinctions resting on marital status remains large and
durable; that in some significant respects the remaining distinctive laws of marriage are
better suited to the life situations of same-sex couples than they are to those of the
opposite-sex couples for whom they were devised; and, most broadly, that the package
of rules relating to marriage, while problematic in some details and unduly exclusive in
some regards, are a just response by the state to the circumstances of persons who live
together in enduring, emotionally based attachments);
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Faultin a No-Fault Era,
82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2526 (1994) (identifying "a dual function of family law, both as a mechanism for
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Several intertwined consequences of this new debate may be
ventured. One contemporary trend in family law today seeks
"opportunities for replacing one-size-fits-all laws with individually
tailored regimes.' 73 The significant increase in couples customizing
their marriages exemplifies this propensity for marital privatization. As
was mentioned earlier, an ever-growing number of couples have shaped
the form of their marriages by drafting prenuptial agreements fixing
many of their legal rights and obligations vis-A-vis each other and the
state. 174 Another source for creative tinkering is illuminated by the
flashlight which civil unions and domestic partnerships aim at traditional
marriage. Careful cataloguing of the diverse elements of marriage
highlights the many meanings of contemporary conjugality: the
multiplicity of the behaviors, duties, relationships, and social boons
encompassed by marriage laws and norms. This Linnaean endeavor may
appear only to be classifying the components, but the resulting roster
serves as a working platform for specialization and recombination. Even
if civil unions seek to replicate marriage rather than shape it, other
marriage-like measures have proven supple in negotiating the political
waters to shape specific benefits and obligations.
The process of sketching the organization of the myriad attributes
of marital and quasi-marital unions has only begun. Professor William
Eskridge's preliminary assessment divides this universe of social rules
and norms into three categories.' 75 The first set consists of commands
requiring private parties to heed or be chargeable to the "emotional unity
of the married or unioned couple.' 76 A second division relates to
parental rights and obligations, while the third classification deals with
the parties as an economic unit "for purposes of their own internal
accounting, their commercial dealings with third parties, and their
obligations (taxes) to the state."'' 77 An earlier effort by Professor David
meeting the needs of family members and as a vehicle for expressing our values and aspirations
about family life to ourselves and to our children").
173. Stake & Grossberg, supra note 3, at 539 (remarks by Jeffrey Evans Stake); see Barbara
Stark, MarriageProposals:From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern MarriageLaw, 89 CAL. L. REV.

1479, 1482 (2001) (explaining "why one-size-fits-all" marriage "actually fits none," and devising
alternative "Marriage Proposals" as more suitable to "postmodern marriage law; that is, marriage
law that explicitly contemplates varied, changing, contextualized forms of marriage, [which] may in
fact be more compatible with contingent, problematic, but nevertheless enduring human love, than
the reified abstraction we now call 'marriage').
174. See supratext accompanying notes 61-63.
175. See generally Eskridge, supra note 157.
176. Id. at 867. These rules treat the partners as emotional fiduciaries for the well-being of each
other. See id.
177. Id
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Chambers, predating the enactment of the civil union law, shuffled the
deck of marriage-like characteristics, but dealt out a similar array.
Chambers suggested three criteria: regulations that "recognize emotional
attachments;" ' 178 those dealing with parenting; 179 and those setting out the
partner-partner and couple-state economic framework. 180 Much work
remains to be done on the permissible content of these bundles of
marriage elements, as well as on issues such as the treatment of
"strategic bundling"''8 and the exact contours of the marriage floor. In
all these ways, American law treats married persons quite differently
than the unmarried; but while the legal system provides certain couples
with a marriage script, it allows for a great deal of improvisation.
The growing extent of this marital diversity suggests that the
concerns raised in this Essay are not limited to conjugal unions "at the
margins"'182 but apply to marriage-however constituted-as a whole.
Whether the vehicle is a prenuptial agreement, civil union, domestic
partnership benefit, or quasi-marriage under the ALI Principles, one
constant holds. Public laws and private bargains intended to expand
domestic entitlements and freedoms cannot help but eventually to limit
them. Thus, another family law trend reemerges. The state continues to
set the floor, the ceiling, and sometimes even the walls within which
experimentation in family forms occurs and unfolds. The unbundling of
marital benefits and duties will by no means lessen the state's role in
domestic relations. As Michael Grossberg reminds us, "we have
inherited a persistent and consistent debate about private ordering in

178. Chambers, supra note 120, at 454. Intestacy laws and rules for allocating decision-making
for an incompetent relative illustrate this type.
179. See id. at461-70.
180. See id. at 470-85. For another compilation of marital attributes, prepared as a response to
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), see COMM'N ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (1995), available at
http://www.state.hi.us/Irb/rpts95/sol/pref.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2004); see also Teresa Stanton
Collett, Benefits, NonmaritalStatus, and the Homosexual Agenda, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 379, 38097 (2002) (listing marital benefits and obligations); Michael S. Wald, Same-Sex Couples: Marriage,
Families, and Children, available at http://www.buddybuddy.com/wald-I .html (Dec. 1999) (same).
181. "Strategic bundling" might consist of decisions made by one party to the marriage to
obtain an advantage over the other, and involve the obligation of the state to craft the applicability
and terms of any remedy. For an illustration of the use of"strategic bundling" in a different context,
see Samuel Noah Weinstein, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 273, 290
n.105 (2002).
182. See Michael Grossberg, Remarks at the Hofstra University School of Law Conference on
Marriage, Democracy, and Families (Mar. 14, 2003) (videotape on file with Hofstra Law Review)
(discussing the impact marriages "at the margins" have had upon the course of family law).
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family law."'1 83 The historical power struggle between public decree and

private devising in our domestic life is never-ending. We quest for an
elusive equilibrium, but each generation sets the appropriate balance by
its own lights, and each successor era realigns the public see-saw.
The danger is that the present debate on the very public stage in
which our marriage morality play is enacted can be polarizing. It can
give the erroneous impression that the debate is either-or, homosexual
marriage or not, survival of traditional marriage or not, when in fact the
policy palette holds many pigments, some of which stand out while
others blend in. Historian Stephanie Coontz observed that "[m]ost
discussions of family issues assume too sharp and permanent a division
between different family forms. 184 She recommended that we pay more
heed to the bridges between different family forms, "the fluidity of those
categories, and the many transitions people make in their lives, as they
or their relatives move through several different types of families and
households.' 8 5 Looking through the prism of marriage's manifold
elements may allow us to consider and implement a broader array of
policy prerogatives so that the public-private debate continues to be
fruitful in expanding marital freedom under law.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Marriage is a palimpsest, a cultural artifact with multiple layers
beneath the surface. Some of those layers reveal a heterosexual dyad
centered on child-raising. Other layers chronicle family ties established
through toil rather than blood. Rubbing to reach another level, the
writings point to the need for hospital visitation rights, so that if your life
partner is critically injured, the hospital will allow you to see him or her,
or at least tell you whether your loved one is alive or dead. Not every
layer has been thoroughly canvassed: whether marriage remains a duet

183. Stake & Grossberg, supra note 3, at 554 (remarks by Michael Grossberg). Grossberg
notes that "private ordering in family law is not new, and.., has a complicated past that has helped
produce the equally complicated present in which we struggle over its meaning." Id. at 553.
184.

STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE REALLY ARE: COMING TO TERMS WITH AMERICA'S

CHANGING FAMILIES 3 (1997). In extending the marital prerogative to same-sex couples,
Massachusetts' highest court set concerns about marriage's demise in historical context:
Alarms about the imminent erosion of the "natural" order of marriage were sounded over
the demise of antimiscegenation laws, the expansion of the rights of married women, and
the introduction of "no-fault" divorce. Marriage has survived all of these
transformations, and we have no doubt that marriage will continue to be a vibrant and
revered institution.
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 967 (Mass. 2003) (footnote omitted).
185.

COONTZ, supra note 184, at 3.
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or includes the pursuit of polyphony is as yet unclear, with the historical
evidence running in both directions.
Each of these examples of family rights and concerns involve a
different combination of the elements of marriage. Considering marriage
in the abstract, or in terms of some asserted central meaning, does not
sufficiently credit the contingency of history. The marital universe is
expanding, but the result need not be family entropy. The next stepY in
86
this venture of family law involves "conversations hard and wild":'
imagining, combining, and implementing different bundles of marital
elements. Unbundling marriage, and searching for appropriate alloys of
its elements, may accommodate marriage's increasingly divergent
constituencies, as well as the greater social good of nourishing healthy
families in a pluralistic world.

186.

See SIMON, supra note 1.
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